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ESSAY
FEDERALIZATION SNOWBALLS:
THE NEED FOR NATIONAL ACTION IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Abigail R. Moncrieff *
Because tort law and healthcare regulation are traditional state functions and because medical, legal, and insurance practices are localized, legal
scholars have long believed that medical malpractice falls within the states’
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty. This conventional view fails to consider the impact that federal healthcare programs have on the states’ incentives to regulate. As a result of federal financing, each state externalizes
some of the costs of its malpractice policy onto the federal government. The
federal government therefore needs to take charge of medical malpractice in
order to fix the spillover problem created by existing federal healthcare
programs.
Importantly, the need for federal intervention in medical malpractice
arises solely from the federal government’s prior decisions to pay a portion of
healthcare spending. Unlike traditional spillover stories, the story here is not
that the states are inevitably ill-suited to govern medical malpractice; rather,
the federal government has made them so. The federal government’s prior
interventions in healthcare spending have snowballed into a need for federalization of medical malpractice. This causal distinction between spillover
and “snowball” stories bears theoretical and practical significance for functional models of federalism, and it could explain and justify federalization
decisions in a range of regulatory regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
We are told that our medical malpractice system is broken.1 Doctors
are sloppy without punition; patients are injured without compensation;
juries seek revenge without proof; and lawyers get rich without justification.2 Meanwhile, the price of liability insurance rises; the practice of
defensive medicine increases; and the rate of healthcare inflation dramatically outpaces the rate of inflation in every other industry.3
1. See Note, Fixing Medical Malpractice Through Health Insurer Enterprise Liability,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1192, 1192 & n.3 (2008) (noting and collecting multitude of scholarly
calls for reform of malpractice system).
2. See Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice 16–19 (1993) (reporting results
of Harvard Medical Practice Study and arguing that malpractice system simultaneously
undercompensates patients and overdeters negligence, resulting in defensive medicine
without accomplishing compensation).
3. Ceci Connolly, Malpractice Situation Not Dire, Study Finds, Wash. Post, Mar. 10,
2005, at A8 (quoting then-President George W. Bush as citing increasing malpractice
insurance premiums and increasing healthcare costs as justifications for federal legislation
that would have capped damages in malpractice litigation).
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Since at least the mid-1970s (when the United States suffered the
first medical malpractice “crisis” of the modern era4), scholars and politicians have debated the causes and the extent of the malpractice problem,
proposing a variety of systemic solutions. Although there has been much
disagreement as to both the true extent of and the proper solution to the
problem, there has been at least one solid academic consensus throughout the debate: To whatever extent medical malpractice matters, it is
solely a matter of state concern.5 That is, although scholars have not fully
agreed on whether there is a genuine problem to solve6 or whether any
given proposal would work to solve it, they have agreed that the federal
government is not the right institution to implement malpractice reforms.7 Because tort law generally and healthcare regulation specifically
are traditional state functions and because medical, legal, and insurance

4. Academic writings from the 1970s noted the “crisis.” See, e.g., Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative
Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417; see also Neal C. Hogan,
Unhealed Wounds: Medical Malpractice in the Twentieth Century 129 (2003) (recounting
emergence of malpractice crisis and dating it back to the 1950s); Cecilia Loh, An Overview
of Medical Malpractice and the Tort Reform Debate, April 23, 2003, at http://www.case.
edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Malpractice.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(dating first medical malpractice “crisis” to 1840).
5. This generalization has one notable exception: Bill Sage and Eleanor Kinney have
argued recently that the Medicare program should implement a comprehensive federal
system for enforcing quality controls against doctors and for compensating Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries who have suffered from negligent care. This proposal is a limited
version of my suggestions here because it represents a federal attempt to control doctor
quality and patient safety. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Dances
with Elephants: Administrative Resolution of Medical Injury Claims by Medicare
Beneficiaries, 5 Ind. Health L. Rev. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Kinney & Sage, Dances with
Elephants] (arguing in favor of administrative resolution of malpractice claims through
Medicare); Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims in
the Medicare Program: Can It Be Done?, 12 Conn. Ins. L.J. 77 (2005) [hereinafter Kinney
& Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims] (assessing legal and practical feasibility of
Medicare-led malpractice reform); William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical
Malpractice Reform, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 217 (2006) [hereinafter Sage, Role of
Medicare] (arguing real malpractice crisis is lack of connection between malpractice
system and healthcare system).
6. There is a scholarly consensus emerging that the core problem is one of patient
safety rather than malpractice litigation. See, e.g., Tom Baker, The Medical Malpractice
Myth 3 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Malpractice Myth] (arguing “the real problem is too
much medical malpractice, not too much litigation”).
7. Cf. James F. Blumstein, A Perspective on Federalism and Medical Malpractice, 14
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 411, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 411, 427–28 (1996) (Joint Symposium Issue)
(noting few limited roles that federal government might properly play in medical
malpractice reform but also concluding that it should not take charge of comprehensive
reforms).
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practices are highly localized, legal scholars have long believed that medical malpractice falls within the states’ jurisdiction and sovereignty.8
Indeed, this view is so widely held that modern legal scholarship
takes it for granted.9 Articles that address general federalism issues use
medical malpractice as an easy example of a localized policy in which
federal intervention lacks functional justification,10 and articles that focus
on federalization of other tort reforms (particularly products liability reform) use medical malpractice as an easy foil, pointing out that the uniformity interest that justifies federalized products liability law does not
apply to medical malpractice law.11
This Essay challenges that scholarly consensus. Although I do not
dispute that both tort law and medical regulation are traditional state
concerns or that all of the relevant industries are localized, I nevertheless
argue that federalization of medical malpractice reform is functionally
justified—and ultimately necessary.12
The justification arises from the political economy of medical malpractice, which suffers from a spillover problem. While a given state fully
internalizes the benefits of inefficient malpractice laws, that state does
not bear the full cost of the inefficiencies. Instead, it externalizes a significant (and ever-growing) portion of those costs onto the federal government and, by extension, onto the other forty-nine states.
8. For the most forceful and robust presentation of this view, see Gary T. Schwartz,
Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 917, 922
(1996) [hereinafter Schwartz, Proper Federal Role].
9. I distinguish here between theoretical scholarship and scholarly commentary on
political debates. Because the 2008 presidential candidates proposed and debated federal
malpractice reform, some scholars have recently addressed the federalism argument in
popular media, including the blogosphere. See, e.g., Rick Hills, Caps Off for Obama?
Med Mal and the ’08 Election, Prawfs Blawg, Mar. 27, 2008, at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/caps-off-for-ob.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
There has not, however, been a serious scholarly consideration of the question since the
mid-1990s.
10. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort
Reform, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 475, 534 (2002) (using medical malpractice reform as
example of federal reform that is less likely to pass constitutional muster because such
reform is directed at “individual” rather than “economic” activity); Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1383–84 (2006)
(using medical malpractice as example of matter that is “quite localized in [its] impact”
and therefore does not need to be federalized).
11. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to
Devolution?, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 429, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 429, 456 (1996) (Joint
Symposium Issue) (“Beyond products liability, the case for federal tort legislation is not
nearly as clear . . . . Despite the growth of tertiary care facilities, medical practice remains
largely local.”); Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 29
(1997) (“[M]ost cases of accidental harm arising in the course of everyday life retain a
distinctly local character; motor vehicle accidents, premises-related mishaps and medical
malpractice injuries account for a very substantial part of the tort docket.”); Schwartz,
Proper Federal Role, supra note 8, at 922 (arguing that medical malpractice is localized
concern appropriate for state regulation).
12. This argument is not a constitutional one; my focus here is purely functional.
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What is the mechanism for externalization of costs? It is the federal
government’s large and growing role in financing Americans’ healthcare
utilization. As of 2006, the federal government was directly responsible,
through Medicare, Medicaid, and a handful of other programs, for about
thirty percent of nationwide healthcare spending.13 The federal government thus pays directly for about one-third of a state’s healthcare consumption, including one-third of malpractice-induced inefficient utilization (both “defensive medicine” and follow-up care after injury).14
Additionally, because the federal tax code subsidizes private healthcare
spending, an additional ten percent of healthcare costs—the subsidized
private costs—are borne by the federal government.15 Those subsidized
private costs are ultimately federal public costs in the form of lost tax
revenue. In total, the federal government bears forty percent of the costs
of U.S. healthcare spending.
Because this significant portion of utilization costs, including those
associated with a state’s malpractice laws, will be borne by the federal
government, it is the only institution that internalizes the full cost-benefit
tradeoff of malpractice policy. The federal government, thus, is best positioned to choose the optimal cost-benefit balance in medical malpractice
policy, and it should therefore intervene in malpractice reform.16
This externalization story, of course, will ring familiar to federalism
scholars. My argument here is an ordinary functional federalism argument, falling comfortably with traditional spillover stories that have justified federalization of, for example, environmental and antitrust law.17
13. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure Web
Tables, at tbl.1, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/
tables.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
CMS, NHE Web Tables] (depicting that federal government spending accounted for
$707.6 billion of more than $2.1 trillion spent on healthcare in United States in 2006).
14. Federal spending is limited to certain patient groups, so the distribution of
malpractice costs among payers depends on the distribution of malpractice costs among
patient groups. It seems likely, though, that the distribution of general expenditures
among patient groups is about the same as the distribution of malpractice-induced
expenditures among patient groups, such that the payment distribution will be roughly the
same for malpractice-induced costs. For more discussion on this point, see infra Part
II.A.3.
15. For the derivation of this percentage, see infra Part II.A.2.
16. Under an uncontroversial representation theory, the federal government must
internalize all national costs and benefits. As a whole, the federal government represents
the interests of all parties in the nation, possibly including the states. This internalization
account often fails in practice—just as the rational actor model I use to analyze state-based
decisionmaking often fails in practice—but that practical failure does not defeat the
empirical and theoretical point that federal healthcare spending systematically skews
states’ incentives. The point here is only that if the current political system worked
perfectly as theorized, we would want the federal government rather than the state
governments to set malpractice policy.
17. The original argument to this effect is Charles Tiebout’s. Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (demonstrating that
competition among local governments will allow those governments to set appropriate
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But there is an important causal difference between the traditional
spillover story and the spillover story at issue here: The externalization
effect that justifies federalization of malpractice reform would not exist
but for a prior decision to federalize a significant portion (but only a
portion) of U.S. healthcare spending. The functional need for federal
intervention in this case arises solely from the federal government’s prior
interventions in financing some healthcare (through Medicare and
Medicaid) and in subsidizing some medical expenses (through tax
breaks). The partial federalization of healthcare spending has thus
snowballed into a functional need for federalization of medical malpractice law.18
This snowball effect is both theoretically and practically significant.
First, it is theoretically significant because federal intervention in a snowball scenario may be offensive to certain federalism values, especially state
sovereignty. The states are not inevitably ill-suited to govern medical malpractice; the federal government has made them so. Federal intervention
in malpractice, thus, could be seen as a greater insult to state sovereignty
than federal intervention in a traditional spillover field like environmental law.
Furthermore, the snowball effect is practically significant because the
need for federal intervention in a snowball scenario could be eliminated
by choosing to dismantle existing federal programs and because future
snowball scenarios can be avoided by deciding not to create limited federal programs. We ought therefore to recognize that we are now facing a
choice between, on the one hand, federalizing medical malpractice and,
on the other, repealing federal programs and tax breaks. And in the fulevels of expenditure on public goods). Tiebout’s general insight has been fleshed out in
the theoretical literature. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Introduction to
Economics of Federalism, at xi, xi–xx (Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein eds., 2007)
(summarizing Tiebout’s theory and surveying literature developing that theory); John D.
Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution
Debate, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 73, 74–77 (describing Tiebout’s “market metaphor”
for interjurisdictional competition and limits thereto); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 43, 45–52 [hereinafter
Inman & Rubinfeld, Rethinking] (noting that three main theories of federalism allow
central governments to intervene, at least to some extent, to fix spillover problems among
states). For specific considerations of spillovers in the areas of antitrust and environmental
law, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ.
23, 38–40 (1983) (discussing effect of “monopoly overcharges” by industries based
primarily in one state); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism
in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196,
1215–16 (1977) (discussing spillover of physical pollution).
18. Critically, my point here is not the oft-made point that the federal government
tends to grow; I am not making a claim about bureaucratic power grabbing or
“centralization creep.” See infra Part III.B. My point is that by federalizing some
healthcare regulation, we created an actual need and justification for further federalization.
Even if federal bureaucrats were perfect agents of the people who fully internalized and
fully appreciated values of state sovereignty, they would want and need to take some
control of medical malpractice law.
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ture, we ought to consider the possibility that new federal programs could
create a need for further federalization of traditionally state-based
regulations.
Given these theoretical and practical considerations, what precise
role should the federal government play in medical malpractice reform?
The right answer certainly is not that Congress should dismantle
Medicare and Medicaid and repeal the tax subsidies so that the states’
incentives will realign. But the necessary alternative, given the snowball
story, is some degree of federal intervention.
Because the discrete problem identified here is purely financial—the
federal government’s large portion of current regulatory costs—it is
tempting to propose a purely financial solution, such as block grants or
categorical grants to states that enact robust malpractice reforms. Such
grants, however, would be nearly impossible to administer because the
necessary level of federal participation would be nearly impossible to calculate.19 I therefore propose substantive federalization, which seems necessary to fix the externality. Of course, given the lack of uniformity concerns in medical malpractice, federalization here need not be fully
preemptive or comprehensive. In order to preserve federalism values
such as competition and experimentation, the federal government could,
for example, allow waivers or run demonstration projects, two approaches that I endorse in Part IV below.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the theoretical and
empirical tie between malpractice reform and healthcare spending, identifying sources of inefficient spending that the current malpractice environment creates and describing academic and political proposals for reducing those inefficiencies. Part II presents the externalization story,
explaining the need for federal involvement in future malpractice reform
efforts. Part III draws out the causal distinction between the snowball
effect and the ordinary spillover effect, discussing the theoretical and
practical importance of the distinction. Part IV outlines a range of federalism values that are important in designing malpractice reform and proposes a form of substantive federalization that balances those federalism
values. Finally, Part V explores the possibility that the snowball story
could be used to justify prior federalization decisions in other regimes
and notes the likelihood that other snowball scenarios have existed and
currently exist.
I. THE CALL

FOR

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM

There are two categories of inefficiency that might arise from our
current medical malpractice system, one of which has been the primary
focus of political argument while the other has become the primary focus
19. See infra Parts IV.B.3–4.
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of academic writing. The first is defensive medicine20—politicians argue
that malpractice litigation overincentivizes provision of diagnostic tests.
The second is patient injury—scholars contend that the malpractice system underincentivizes effective precautions.21
Despite having produced voluminous empirical and theoretical literatures on medical malpractice reform, academics and politicians have
continued to disagree—both between and among themselves—on the
significance of malpractice-related inefficiencies to healthcare costs and
on the causal relationship between those inefficiencies and malpractice
litigation. That is, they have disagreed on whether defensive medicine or
patient injury adds significantly to healthcare inflation, and they have disagreed on the extent to which any alteration to the malpractice system
could reduce defensive practices or iatrogenic (i.e., physician-caused) injury. They have also disagreed on how best to fix the inefficiencies that
exist. While politicians emphasize “first-generation” reforms such as caps
on damages, scholars emphasize “second-generation” reforms such as alternative dispute resolution; and while politicians continue to push for
federal-level reforms, scholars continue to insist that state-level reforms
are more appropriate.22
For present purposes, we need not tangle much with the unanswered
empirical and causal questions. Only two aspects of the voluminous malpractice literature are centrally relevant to this Essay: first, the theoretical
ties between malpractice incentives and healthcare costs, and second, the
20. See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?,
111 Q.J. Econ. 353, 354–55 (1996) [hereinafter Kessler & McClellan, Do Doctors] (finding
that malpractice reforms that decrease liability pressure on doctors result in decreased
utilization but not increased mortality or morbidity and therefore concluding that
defensive medicine occurs and may be decreased by changes in litigation environment);
see also Cong. Budget Office, Medical Malpractice Tort Limits and Health Care Spending
2 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71xx/doc7174/04-28-Medical
Malpractice.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter CBO, Medical
Malpractice Tort Limits] (noting that tort reform might affect utilization by decreasing
defensive medicine); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in Handbook
of Health Economics 1339, 1343 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000)
(noting that liability might induce “either cost-justified injury prevention that the system is
intended to encourage or defensive practices that are not cost-justified”); Daniel P. Kessler,
Evaluating the US Malpractice System and Paths to Its Reform 4–5 (Dec. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Kessler,
Evaluating US Malpractice] (summarizing theory of defensive medicine).
21. Baker, Malpractice Myth, supra note 6, at 3 (“[T]he real costs of medical
malpractice have little to do with litigation. [They] are the lost lives, extra medical
expenses, time out of work, and pain and suffering of tens of thousands of people every
year [who are injured by physicians], the vast majority of whom do not sue.”); Inst. of Med.,
To Err Is Human 1 (2000) [hereinafter IOM, To Err] (concluding, based on empirical
work, that between 44,000 and 98,000 “Americans die each year as a result of medical
errors”).
22. For an overview of government attempts at tort reform, see Rogan Kersh, Medical
Malpractice and the New Politics of Health Care, in Medical Malpractice and the U.S.
Health Care System 43, 46–49 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).
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substantive and federalism debates surrounding proposals for malpractice reform.
This Part briefly reviews both. Part I.A presents the cost-saving goals
of malpractice reform by describing two kinds of inefficient healthcare
utilization that might arise from the current malpractice environment:
defensive medicine and post-injury care. Part I.B briefly describes academic and political debates over reform options, highlighting not only
the necessity of choosing among substantive reform proposals but also
the necessity of choosing between state and federal governments for
implementation.
A. Medical Malpractice and Healthcare Utilization
Throughout modern debates on medical malpractice, the primary
goal of reform-minded politicians and scholars has been the reduction of
healthcare costs.23 Since the malpractice crisis of the 1970s, calls for reform have centered on the promise of decreasing costs associated with
medical malpractice litigation and thereby reducing U.S. healthcare
spending.
Importantly, the direct cost of litigation is not the only or even the
primary source of malpractice-induced healthcare costs; litigation costs
amount to only one or two percent of total U.S. healthcare spending.24
And that figure includes the cost to doctors of carrying liability insurance,
meaning that even the premium spikes of the 1970s, 1980s, and early
2000s had relatively small effects on national health expenditures (at least
in percentage terms).25
But there are also indirect costs associated with malpractice policy,
which are likely more substantial in themselves and which add to the
23. See Connolly, supra note 3 (quoting then-President Bush as saying, “If you’re a
patient, [the malpractice problem] means you’re paying a higher cost to go see your
doctor”).
24. Cong. Budget Office, Economic and Budget Issue Brief, Limiting Tort Liability for
Medical Malpractice 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/
01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“But even large
savings in premiums can have only a small direct impact on health care spending—private
or governmental—because malpractice costs account for less than 2 percent of that
spending.”); Danzon, supra note 20, at 1343 (“Malpractice premiums account for roughly
one percent of total health care spending, hence are not a significant contributor to the
level or growth of health care costs.”).
25. It is important to understand that the one percent figure still represents a
significant expenditure in dollar terms. National health expenditures in 2006 were $2.1
trillion, CMS, NHE Web Tables, supra note 13, at tbl.1, meaning that the malpractice
system costs about $21 billion per year in litigation costs alone. Furthermore, these costs
are passed on to healthcare consumers, so even doctors’ and hospitals’ litigation costs
become consumers’ healthcare costs in the U.S. system. See Mark V. Pauly, Who Pays
When Malpractice Premiums Rise?, in Medical Malpractice and the U.S. Health Care
System, supra note 22, at 71, 77–80 (noting evidence that when malpractice premiums
increased, doctors’ fees increased “with an elasticity sufficiently large to imply 100 percent
forward shifting”).
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more tangible litigation costs. The indirect costs arise from two categories of inefficient utilization that the malpractice system simultaneously
incentivizes (defensive medicine) and fails to deter (post-injury care). Although these indirect costs are notoriously difficult to measure,26 their
empirical existence is widely accepted, and their theoretical underpinnings are well developed.27
The theory behind defensive medicine is that doctors will overprovide diagnostic tests and other precautionary procedures in order to create an appearance of legally adequate care (to avoid an appearance of
negligence). Motivated by a fear of litigation and a fear of adverse judgments, doctors provide more blood work, more MRIs, more biopsies than
are cost-justified, hoping to demonstrate to their patients and perhaps
jurors that they are being duly cautious. Some “defensive” utilization provides at least some medical benefit to the patient, so the inefficiency associated with it is only the difference between social cost and social benefit.
Other defensive utilization may be medically useless or even harmful to
the patient, making the inefficiency the full cost of the service plus the
cost of any resulting harm.28 Based on survey results29 and some other
empirical testing,30 scholars generally agree that doctors practice defensive medicine, though the extent of the problem has been impossible to
measure with precision. The important point for present purposes is
only that the current malpractice system creates pressure for doctors to
overprovide precautionary services, and the aggregate cost of any resulting overprovision constitutes an inefficient inflation of U.S. healthcare
spending.
Of course, there are also nonmedical benefits to defensive medicine
that may weaken states’ motivation to eliminate the practice. For exam26. See Baker, Malpractice Myth, supra note 6, at 24–25 (describing most common
approaches to measuring rates of negligent injury and noting approaches’ weaknesses);
CBO, Medical Malpractice Tort Limits, supra note 20, at 35 (noting “the difficulty of
disentangling any effects of tort limits from other factors that affect levels of spending for
health care”); Danzon, supra note 20, at 1343 (noting that “there remain no good
empirical measures of the changes in medical care that are induced by liability” and that
those changes “are alleged to contribute significantly to total healthcare costs”); id. at
1366–68 (surveying empirical studies); Michelle Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical
Malpractice System: Structure and Performance, in Medical Malpractice and the U.S.
Health Care System, supra note 22, at 11, 23–25 (noting difficulties in measuring rates and
kinds of defensive medicine).
27. Danzon, supra note 20, at 1364–69 (reviewing empirical sources and theoretical
underpinnings of defensive medicine and iatrogenic injury).
28. See id. at 1343 (noting that liability might induce extra care that might constitute
“either cost-justified injury prevention that the system is intended to encourage or
defensive practices that are not cost-justified”); Kessler & McClellan, Do Doctors, supra
note 20, at 354 (noting that defensive medicine “may even have adverse effects on patient
health outcomes, if liability induces providers either to administer harmful treatments or
to forgo risky but beneficial ones”); Mello & Studdert, supra note 26, at 25 (noting
examples of medically useless and harmful defensive medicine).
29. Kessler, Evaluating US Malpractice, supra note 20, at 6–7 (collecting sources).
30. Id. at 8–9 (collecting sources).
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ple, patients might like defensive medicine if it reassures them of diagnostic accuracy or generally makes them feel better cared for. Doctors
might also like defensive medicine if it provides a demonstration of adequate care, which might be useful to the doctor-patient relationship for
reasons independent of the liability system. The practice of defensive
medicine thus gives rise to inefficient medical and monetary costs but
also provides nonmedical and nonmonetary benefits.
The second source of inefficiency—patient injury—results from an
opposing effect of the current malpractice environment: the underdeterrence of negligence. Because so few injured patients sue, doctors and
hospitals lack a full incentive to invest in cost-justified safety measures
that would reduce probabilities of injury.31 Negligent iatrogenic injuries
thus continue to occur with alarming frequency.32 Those injuries then
give rise to a host of avoidable costs, including most significantly the cost
of additional healthcare to treat the injuries. As should be apparent,
those additional healthcare costs are purely inefficient since negligent injuries are, by definition, avoidable through cost-justified precautions. As
with costs arising from defensive medicine, the healthcare costs of malpractice-related injuries are difficult or even impossible to measure with
precision.33 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that such injuries occur regularly and that they give rise to avoidable healthcare spending.34
As with defensive medicine, there are benefits to allowing patient
injury to occur. In order to decrease rates of patient injury, doctors and
hospitals might need to make dramatic reforms to their structures (including both physical and relational structures). To take one straightforward example, the medical community might need to change doctors’
and nurses’ work hours and training systems, which would require
changes to contractual relationships and basic educational programs that
have been standard for decades. Changing those structures could be
quite costly, at least in the short term. Although patient injury gives rise
to inefficient healthcare costs for affected patients and their payers, maintenance of the current injury rate also provides a benefit to hospitals and
doctors in the form of avoided systemic costs of necessary reforms.
In sum, the current medical malpractice system gives rise not only to
direct litigation costs but also to indirect utilization costs. All of those
utilization costs, although providing some benefits to affected parties,
31. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085, 1088–92 (2006) (reviewing
empirical literature on frequency of suits and concluding that too few injured patients file
claims).
32. See IOM, To Err, supra note 21, at 1–2 (finding high rates of injury and death,
resulting in high systemic costs associated with iatrogenic injury).
33. See Baker, Malpractice Myth, supra note 6, at 24–25 (describing most common
approaches to measuring rates of negligent injury and noting weaknesses of each).
34. IOM, To Err, supra note 21, at 40–41 (giving $17 billion per year as best estimate
of total costs, only part of which constitutes healthcare costs).
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also inefficiently increase our national health expenditures, contributing
to the healthcare industry’s alarming inflation rate.
B. Reform Debates: Scholars and Politicians, Substance and Federalism
How should we change the malpractice system to reduce—or even
eliminate—these inefficiencies? And which governmental institution (or
institutions) should take responsibility for implementing malpractice reforms? Scholars and politicians have debated these questions for decades, but their conclusions have diverged, particularly in recent years.
On the substantive question, politicians have focused on amendments to
the litigation system while scholars have urged alternatives to that system.
On the federalism question, scholars have generally agreed that state
policymaking is more appropriate while politicians have increasingly
pushed for federal implementation of policy solutions.
1. Substantive: Which Reform? — The first relevant question is the
substantive one: Which reform option or options should we implement?
Throughout the decades-long malpractice debate, politicians have focused on first-generation reforms, proposing and passing amendments to
the litigation process. In recent years, however, academics have largely
disparaged such first-generation proposals, instead urging wholesale alternatives to traditional tort litigation—or second-generation reforms.35
Starting in the 1970s, state legislatures have implemented a variety of
first-generation reforms, including caps on damages, caps on attorneys’
fees, modification or elimination of joint and several liability rules, elimination of collateral source restrictions, and amendments to statutes of
limitations.36 Empirical studies of those reforms show that they have had,
at best, minimal impacts on healthcare spending and healthcare quality.37 But despite the apparent ineffectiveness of first-generation reforms
35. See, e.g., Kersh, supra note 22, at 43 (drawing and defining distinction between
“first-generation” and “second-generation” reforms); see also William M. Sage, Medical
Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s Clothes, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 463, 463–64 (2005)
(noting that politicians have the wrong end of the stick by focusing on first-generation
reforms, especially damages caps, and that academics are on the better track).
36. See generally Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., Medical Malpractice Liability
Reform: Legal Issues and Fifty-State Survey of Caps on Punitive Damages and
Noneconomic Damages, available at http://shelby.senate.gov/legislation/Medical
Malpractice.pdf (last updated Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Cohen, Medical Malpractice Liability Reform] (outlining individual states’
tort reform proposals and discussing their costs and benefits from legal perspective);
Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Oct. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
902711 (providing comprehensive data regarding state tort reform laws).
37. For surveys of the empirical literature, see CBO, Medical Malpractice Tort Limits,
supra note 20, at 1–3, 20–27 (summarizing existing empirical estimates and reporting
inconclusive empirical estimates from new analyses of Medicare spending); Danzon, supra
note 20, at 1371–78 (cataloging “traditional” tort reforms and concluding that most
“result, at best, in simply shifting costs from medical providers to patients and taxpayers; at
worst, total social costs may actually increase if, for example, deterrence incentives are
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at reducing costs or improving quality, members of Congress and former
President George W. Bush have urged federal adoption of the same basic
package, particularly emphasizing damage caps.38
Unlike political actors, many normative legal and economics scholars
have shifted their focus from these mere modifications to malpractice litigation to the adoption of wholesale alternatives to it. They have proposed replacing traditional litigation with, for example, no-fault insurance, enterprise liability, private contracting, independent health courts,
uniform practice standards, and alternative dispute resolution.39 Within
the academic community, scholars continue to debate the theoretical virtues of and difficulties with these proposals, and there has been little
agreement on whether any of the academic proposals could accomplish
its goals. No single second-generation reform, thus, has emerged from
weakened”); Kessler, Evaluating US Malpractice, supra note 20, at 12 (finding
approximately three to four percent reduction in healthcare spending in jurisdictions that
have passed statutory tort reforms, but questioning causal link). For studies completed
after those surveys were published, see, e.g., David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of
Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. Legal Analysis
(forthcoming 2009) (analyzing effect of 2003 Texas cap of noneconomic damages on
verdicts, payouts, and settlements); Nancy L. Zisk, The Limitations of Legislatively Imposed
Damages Caps: Proposing a Better Way to Control the Costs of Medical Malpractice, 30
Seattle U. L. Rev. 119, 122–23 (2006) (noting “the mounting evidence against the
effectiveness of damages caps”); Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of
Tort Reform on Private Health Insurance Coverage (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law,
Public Law and Legal Theory Series No. 07-16, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=995270 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using empirical data to assess tort
reform’s effect on health insurance coverage).
38. Allison H. Eid, Tort Reform and Federalism: The Supreme Court Talks, Bush
Listens, Hum. Rts., Fall 2002, at 10, 11 (describing President Bush’s arguments in favor of
“federal limitations on medical malpractice suits”).
39. For summaries of arguments for and against all of these proposals, see Danzon,
supra note 20, at 1376–82; Note, supra note 1, at 1197–1203. For examples of papers
proposing or refuting these ideas, see Kenneth Abraham, The Forms and Functions of
Tort Law 261 (3d ed. 2007) (describing no-fault insurance); Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley
MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1929 (2003) (discussing enterprise liability); Paul J. Barringer, III, A New
Prescription for America’s Medical Liability System, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 235 (2006)
(proposing creation of health courts); Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Principle Versus
Legislative Fixes: Coming to Closure on the Unending Travails of Medical Malpractice, 54
DePaul L. Rev. 503 (2005) (proposing private contracting); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health
Courts and Malpractice Claims Adjudication Through Medicare: Some Questions, 9 J.
Health Care L. & Pol’y 280 (2006) (discussing Sage’s proposal of health courts run
through Medicare); Kinney & Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, supra note 5
(proposing health courts run through Medicare); Sage, Role of Medicare, supra note 5
(same); Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An
Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 385 (2005) (proposing
information disclosure); Emily Chow, Note, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of
Medical Malpractice with Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics
387 (2007) (arguing against health courts); Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Malpractice
Liability (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-12, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105368 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (refuting
private contracting).
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the theoretical literature as the best option for implementation.40 Perhaps as a result of this internal scholarly disagreement, the state legislatures have shown little interest in adopting any of these ideas, and
Congress has never considered national adoption of any such proposal.
That said, Congress has considered bills that would fund limited demonstration projects for some of the academy’s more dramatic proposals.41
In sum, politicians as a group seem to agree that first-generation reforms are the best option, while scholars as a group seem to agree that
such reforms are insufficient. But scholars have continued to disagree as
to which second-generation reforms should be tried, and politicians have
shown only minimal interest in testing second-generation proposals.
2. Federalism: Which Government? — Even if there were broad agreement that a single reform option was the best, we still would need to
confront the federalism question of whether the state governments or the
federal government should implement that reform. On that question,
national politicians are moving towards a consensus that the federal government should take over malpractice, while academics have long believed that the state governments should retain that responsibility.
a. Politicians. — Although the federal government has actively considered malpractice reforms throughout the modern debate, the states
have been the only active players in implementing such reforms. The
state legislatures were the first movers on malpractice policy in the mid1970s as several states enacted statutory reforms,42 including most famously California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA).43 In waves that tracked the malpractice insurance crises of the
1970s, 1980s, and 2000s, all state legislatures eventually followed suit so
that by 2007, every state had implemented at least one of the first-generation reforms listed above.44
Throughout that time, however, the federal government has participated actively in the malpractice debate. The Senate started holding
hearings on medical malpractice in the late 1960s, and President Nixon
convened a commission to study the issue in the early 1970s.45 Impor40. See generally Danzon, supra note 20, at 1376–82 (noting theoretical advantages
and disadvantages of all proposals without settling on any option as best theoretically).
41. See, e.g., Better HEALTH Act of 2003, S. 1374, 108th Cong. § 603 (2003)
(proposing “National Patient Safety Research Demonstration System” to collect data on
patient safety and to test improvements).
42. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1419 n.6 (listing state statutes limiting liability of
healthcare providers).
43. 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949.
44. See Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, Medical Liability Reform, at http://www.atra.org/
issues/index.php?issue=7338 (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing medical liability laws of each state); Comm. on Law & Criminal Justice,
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Medical Malpractice: State Medical Liability Laws
2007, at http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/StateMedliablitylaws2007.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
45. William J. Curran, Public Health and the Law: A National Commission on
Medical Malpractice, 61 Am. J. Pub. Health 2313, 2313 (1971); Kersh, supra note 22, at 45.
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tantly, as states’ efforts have proven ineffective, both the seriousness and
the robustness of federal proposals have steadily increased. Whereas the
congressional proposals of the 1970s and 1980s never passed either chamber and would have simply funded the states’ efforts,46 two modern proposals have passed the House of Representatives,47 and most bills introduced today are comprehensive reforms that would preempt state
efforts.48 Even opponents of first-generation reforms in Congress have
proposed federal alternatives that still would preempt state efforts. For
example, former Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama cosponsored a bill in 2005 that would have shielded physicians from state-level
liability if they admitted to their mistakes and entered into settlement
negotiations.49
Of course, opponents of malpractice reform still invoke state sovereignty as an argument against federal bills, but that argument seems to be
losing traction as national politicians on both sides of the aisle push federal adoption of the legislative approach that best captures their preferences. Preemptive federal legislation, thus, seems increasingly likely to
reach the President’s desk in the coming years.50
46. See, e.g., Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, H.R. 5110, 99th Cong.
(1986); Federal Incentives for State Health Care Professional Liability Reform Act of 1985,
S. 1804, 99th Cong. (1985); Alternative Medical Liability Act, H.R. 5400, 98th Cong.
(1984); National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975, S. 482, 94th
Cong. (1975); National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance Act of 1975, S. 215, 94th
Cong. (1975); Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act, S. 188, 94th Cong. (1975); S.
1211, 94th Cong. (1975); Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. (1986); Alternative
Medical Liability Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 98th Cong. (1984).
47. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003,
H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act, H.R. 3160,
104th Cong. §§ 271–283 (1996).
48. See H.R. 5; H.R. 3160; see also Cohen, Medical Malpractice Liability Reform,
supra note 36, at 3–4 (summarizing preemption provisions of HEALTH Act of 2003).
49. National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also Robert A. Clifford, The Candidates and Tort Reform, Chi. Law., Feb. 1,
2008, at 42 (reporting records of Senators Clinton and Obama on tort reform, including
medical malpractice reform).
50. Cf. Clifford, supra note 49, at 42 (“Regardless of who becomes president in
November, our government should not make it more difficult for people who have been
injured to receive compensation . . . . It remains to be seen whether November’s election
will bring more hardship for those injured by wrongdoers.”); Joseph Curl, McCain Vows
Tax, Spending Restraint; Calls Democratic Foes ‘Liberal,’ Wash. Times, Feb. 18, 2008, at
A06 (quoting Republican candidate Senator John McCain as calling for malpractice
reform); Deb Price & Kim Kozlowski, Market-Based Solutions Touted: GOP Contenders
Push Plans in Financially Unhealthy Mich., Detroit News, Jan. 10, 2008, at 1B (reporting
that both Senator McCain and his primary rival, Governor Mitt Romney, support medical
malpractice reform). But see Kersh, supra note 22, at 66–67 (arguing that federal
politicians may be deadlocked and malpractice reform might instead be implemented
through judicial decision).
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b. Scholars. — Meanwhile, scholars remain firmly convinced that
medical malpractice is a state issue, such that any federal legislation
would be inappropriate.51 In making this argument, academics consider
two traditional justifications for federalization: uniformity needs and
spillover problems. They almost universally conclude that those justifications are inapposite to medical malpractice policy.
The foundations for this view are, first, that the relevant industries
are localized and, second, that jurisdictional rules are settled.52 Doctors
typically practice in only one state; liability insurers write state-specific (or
even locality-specific) policies for actuarial reasons; and jurisdictional
rules limit plaintiffs to the forum in which they were injured. As a result,
neither doctors nor insurance companies need to conform to multiple
states’ liability rules. Doctors can conform their standards of care to the
legal minimum in the state in which they practice, without worrying that
they will be subject to liability in a more stringent state; and insurance
companies can conform their policy limits and coverable events to the
legal standards in the state for which the policy is drafted, without worrying that the insured will be subject to liability elsewhere. There is, therefore, no need to create uniformity of medical malpractice standards
across state lines.53
For the same underlying reasons, there is little risk that one state can
externalize litigation costs onto another state. Because medical malpractice defendants get sued in the state in which they practice, the damages
that a jury awards against those defendants will come out of the jurors’
51. Again, Bill Sage and Eleanor Kinney represent a notable exception to this
generalization, having proposed a comprehensive federal system for Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries. See supra note 5. Sage and Kinney, however, write from the
perspective of substantive institutional competence rather than the perspective of
federalism theory, arguing only that the Medicare agency would bring a substantive
expertise to the malpractice problem that generalist state legislatures lack. They do not
argue, as I do, that there is any functional need for federal intervention in malpractice
reform efforts.
52. See Hills, supra note 9 (noting regional nature of tort laws and well-settled choice
of law rules for medical malpractice cases); see also Ackerman, supra note 11, at 456
(“Beyond products liability, the case for federal tort legislation is not nearly as clear. . . .
Despite the growth of tertiary care facilities, medical practice remains largely local.”);
Schwartz, Proper Federal Role, supra note 8, at 922–24 (critiquing federalism interest in
malpractice and pointing out logic of tort law developed and administered at state level).
53. Although “medical tourism”—or travel across state or national lines for medical
care—has become more common, it remains the case that doctors serving out-of-state
patients can be sued only in their home forum. Out-of-state courts lack personal
jurisdiction over a doctor that practiced only at home, even if the injured patient is not a
resident of the doctor’s home state. See, e.g., Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 288–89 (9th
Cir. 1972) (finding no jurisdiction in Idaho over South Dakota doctor who treated Idaho
citizen in South Dakota). But see Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 671–72 (9th Cir.
1984) (allowing jurisdiction over nonresident doctor who intentionally solicited business
from state). An exception might arise if the doctor owns property or has other significant
ties in the patient’s home state such that she could be sued there, but such a situation
would be too rare to justify uniformity of malpractice standards.
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home economy. The forum state, thus, has adequate incentives to avoid
excessive damage awards.
These points distinguish medical malpractice from another area of
tort law that has been subject to both state and federal legislative reform:
products liability. Unlike doctors, product manufacturers do not typically
confine their business to a particular state; most sell their products nationwide or even worldwide. They would therefore benefit, perhaps substantially, from uniform safety and liability standards across state lines.
Furthermore, jurisdictional rules allow manufacturers to be sued in any
state in which their products cause injury. An Ohio-based firm, thus,
could be sued in Texas, and the damages awarded against that firm in the
Texas court would come out of Ohio’s economy. In a products liability
suit, therefore, there is a greater possibility that the jury could externalize
a portion of litigation costs (especially damages costs) onto another
state.54
Under a straightforward application of functional federalism arguments, medical malpractice and products liability seem to be perfect foils.
In products liability, because firms operate nationwide and can be sued in
any state, we see both a uniformity need arising from liability standards
and a spillover problem arising from damage awards. Both of those
problems justify federal action in products liability law. But neither the
need for uniformity associated with liability rules nor the spillover problem associated with damages justifies federal action in medical malpractice law. Doctors almost always get sued in the state in which they
practice.55
This account of federal tort reform—this apparent division between
products liability and medical malpractice—is the one that is so widely
accepted, that is taken for granted, in the legal literature. While scholars
do not seem ardently opposed to Congress’s efforts in medical malpractice and although many accept that congressional action would
pass constitutional muster,56 they have long believed that a federal
54. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 10, at 1386–89 (“Products liability law raises
the specter of spillover effects, whereby a state . . . exports the cost of its regulation to outof-state manufacturers and product consumers . . . .”); Schwartz, Proper Federal Role,
supra note 8, at 932–37 (discussing structural bias theory that when states increase
products liability, costs are exported out-of-state and benefits remain in-state).
55. See supra note 53.
56. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 443 (noting that “current federal funding of
Medicare and Medicaid” could “serve as a [constitutional] rationale for federal
intervention in the law of medical malpractice” under spending power); Blumstein, supra
note 7, at 425 (“The Supreme Court has construed the Commerce Clause so broadly that
large-scale federal intervention in the medical malpractice area is almost certainly
constitutionally valid.”); E. Donald Elliott, Sanjay A. Narayan & Moneen S. Nasmith,
Administrative “Health Courts” for Medical Injury Claims: The Federal Constitutional
Issues, 33 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 761, 765 (2008) (concluding that health courts
legislation would be constitutional if properly drafted); Nim Razook, A National Medical
Malpractice Reform Act (and Why the Supreme Court May Prefer to Avoid It), 28 Seton
Hall Legis. J. 99, 125–26 (2003) (using HEALTH Act of 2003 to demonstrate difficulties in
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incursion on the states’ sovereignty over medical malpractice would be
unjustified.57
II. MALPRACTICE

AND

SPILLOVERS: THE PROBLEM

OF

UTILIZATION COSTS

Although federalism scholars correctly note that a given state cannot
externalize its malpractice-related litigation costs onto another state, they
wrongly conclude on that basis that malpractice policy is free of spillover
problems. The failure in the scholars’ logic is that it focuses only on the
direct litigation costs of the tort system, ignoring the utilization costs associated with malpractice policy choices. In fact, the states not only can but
must externalize a significant portion of the utilization costs associated
with their malpractice policies, giving rise to a serious spillover problem
that justifies federal intervention.
Why must the states externalize those costs? Because for a large and
growing percentage of American healthcare consumption, the federal
government foots the bill. Through several spending programs, including most famously Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP), the federal government directly pays a portion of enrollees’ healthcare expenses. For those patients, the states externalize the full federal portion of inefficient utilization costs. Additionally, through a series of targeted tax breaks, the federal government
subsidizes private healthcare spending. Some of the costs of inefficient
utilization, thus, are externalized to the federal government in the form
of lost tax revenue; inefficient utilization raises the cost of private healthcare and thereby reduces privately insured patients’ taxable income.
commerce clause jurisprudence); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leavy Mathews
III, Federalism and Federal Liability Reform: The United States Constitution Supports
Reform, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 269, 272 (1999) (analyzing several tort reform bills, including
some related to medical injury, and concluding that such reforms have “ample basis for
support in the Constitution”); Eid, supra note 38, at 11 (noting that Supreme Court would
uphold medical malpractice reform if regulated activity were understood to be economic
activity of purchasing healthcare services rather than arguably noneconomic activity of
injuring patients); see also Henry Cohen & Vanessa K. Burrows, Cong. Research Serv.,
Federal Tort Reform Legislation: Constitutionality and Summaries of Selected Statutes
(2003) (concluding that both federal products liability reform and federal medical
malpractice reform would be constitutional). But see Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T.
Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the
Constitutional Envelope?, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 591, 593 (1999) (noting that so-called
“third-wave” tort reforms, including medical malpractice reform, raise new and harder
constitutional issues); Grey, supra note 10, at 534 (concluding that federal tort reform
“that regulates a commercial area with direct economic impact—such as the airline
industry—will fare better than legislation directed at individual activity—such as medical
malpractice”); Collin Sult, Note, Questionable Medicine—Why Federal Medical
Malpractice Reform May Be Unconstitutional, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 195, 198 (2005) (expressing
skepticism about HEALTH Act’s constitutionality under “Supreme Court’s more recent
pronouncements defining the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause”).
57. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
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These externalization effects are significant. Direct federal spending
(including spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP) amounted to
about $707.6 billion in 2006, or about thirty percent of total national
health expenditures.58 The value of the federal tax subsidies in 2006 was
about $225.8 billion,59 taking the federal government’s share to about
forty percent. The federal government thus paid for about forty cents of
the average dollar spent on U.S. healthcare in 2006. Because malpractice-related inefficient utilization is probably evenly distributed among patient populations,60 the federal government likely pays for that same forty
percent share—or almost half—of the inefficient utilization that results
from a state’s malpractice system, allowing the states to internalize the
benefits of inefficient malpractice rules61 while externalizing a significant
portion of associated costs.
Part II.A fleshes out the externalization effects that result from federal spending programs and tax subsidies. Part II.B explains the spillover
problem that arises from that externalization and situates malpractice’s
spillover problem within the functional federalism literature.
A. Externalization Effects
This subsection details the mechanisms and magnitudes of the externalization that arises from federal spending programs and tax subsidies.
Part II.A.1 provides further details on healthcare spending programs, focusing particularly on Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP. Part II.A.2 provides further details on federal tax breaks, focusing particularly on the
exemption for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). Part II.A.3 discusses
the specifically malpractice-related externalization that occurs through
those general expenditures, demonstrating that the federal government
probably foots the bill for forty percent of specifically malpractice-induced utilization costs.
1. Direct Spending: Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP. — The first externalization mechanism for medical malpractice is a group of federal
spending programs that includes most significantly Medicare, Medicaid,
58. CMS, NHE Web Tables, supra note 13, at tbl.1.
59. The total estimate of $225.8 billion is the sum of the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s estimates for lost income taxes ($152.5 billion) and Selden and Gray’s estimate
for lost payroll taxes ($73.3 billion). See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2006–2010, at 38–40 (2006), available at http://www.
house.gov/jct/s-2-06.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Joint Comm.,
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures] (estimating aggregate value of all individual and
corporate exemptions related to healthcare as $152.5 billion in 2006, which includes only
foregone income taxes); Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for
Employment-Related Health Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25 Health Aff. 1568, 1570–71
& tbl.1 (2006) (estimating value of federal employer-sponsored insurance exemption in
2006 as $185.2 billion, which includes $73.3 billion in foregone income and payroll (or
“FICA”) taxes).
60. See infra Part II.A.3.
61. See infra Part II.B.2.
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and SCHIP. These programs fund their enrollees’ healthcare expenses
through complicated and variable systems that are beyond the scope of
this Essay, but the common and relevant characteristic of all such programs is that they provide their enrollees with public health insurance
that is financed at least in part by federal revenues. Under Medicare, the
federal government provides those revenues directly to healthcare providers that serve Medicare patients. Under Medicaid and SCHIP, the federal government financially participates in state-administered and partially state-funded public insurance programs.
When a Medicare enrollee consumes healthcare services, almost all
of the resulting monetary burden falls on the federal government. Although Medicare enrollees are responsible for an out-of-pocket premium, copay, or deductible for some services and although healthcare
providers might shift some of the cost of Medicare consumption to private payers (if Medicare under-reimburses for certain services), the federal government picks up the bulk of Medicare enrollees’ costs. As a result, if a state enacts a law that causes Medicare enrollees to increase their
consumption of healthcare services, the consequent increase in healthcare costs will fall largely on the federal government.
Under Medicaid and SCHIP, the federal government provides grants
to the states, which then administer the programs. When a Medicaid enrollee consumes healthcare services, thus, a state agency writes the check,
but in every state, at least half of the Medicaid program’s budget comes
from federal revenue. (The level of “federal financial participation” in
Medicaid varies by state, but the lowest level is fifty percent. The average
in 2006 was 59.28%.62) Importantly, because the federal government’s
share in a state’s Medicaid program is determined on a percentage basis,
increases in the states’ Medicaid costs necessarily increase the federal government’s Medicaid costs. As a result, if a state enacts a law that causes
Medicaid enrollees to increase their consumption of healthcare services,
at least half of the consequent increase in healthcare costs will fall on the
federal government.
Medicare, Medicaid, and similar federal programs accounted for
about thirty percent of total U.S. healthcare spending in 2006.63 But be62. Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, FY 2006, 69 Fed.
Reg. 68,370, 68,370–73 (Nov. 24, 2004) (listing “federal financial participation” (or “FFP”)
levels for all fifty states for fiscal year 2006).
63. The breakdown of health expenditures is as follows: Of the $2.1 trillion in health
expenditures nationwide, $707.6 billion represent federal expenditures. CMS, NHE Web
Tables, supra note 13, at tbl.3. That federal total includes Medicare expenditures of
$402.3 billion, Medicaid expenditures of $174.9 billion, SCHIP expenditures of $5.4
billion, and other expenditures amounting to $125 billion. Id. (listing federal Medicare
and Medicaid expenditures); Statehealthfacts.org, Federal SCHIP Expenditures, FY
1998–2007, at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=234&cat=4 (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing federal SCHIP
spending). The federal expenditure total does not include the cost of tax breaks or the
cost of the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan (FEHBP).
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cause these federal programs are restricted to certain patient populations, this figure does not mean that the federal government paid thirty
cents of every marginal dollar spent on U.S. healthcare. The federal government pays for more than thirty percent of the utilization it finances,
but it finances less than one hundred percent of total utilization. I will
return to this point in Part II.A.3.
For now, I mean to highlight only two aspects of direct federal
healthcare spending: that its absolute magnitude increases and decreases
as relevant patients’ healthcare utilization increases and decreases and
that the direct federal portion of total healthcare spending is substantial.
2. Tax Breaks: Employer-Sponsored Insurance. — The second externalization mechanism is a group of federal tax exemptions, deductions, and
credits for healthcare spending, which includes most significantly the exemption for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). Under these tax
breaks, income spent on healthcare is excluded or deducted from taxable
income. The tax breaks, thus, constitute federal spending in the form of
foregone revenue, intended to subsidize private healthcare consumption.
In effect, the federal government gives up income in order to decrease
the private cost of healthcare goods and services.
Of these tax breaks, the ESI exemption is the most significant. It
affects more than ninety percent of privately insured patients (the percentage of such patients that receive insurance through employment),
and it allows almost the full cost of the insurance premium to be excluded from both the employee’s and the employer’s taxable income.
Importantly, even though employers pay insurance premiums directly,
the cost of the insurance ultimately comes out of employees’ wages.64
Employees who receive health benefits at work are simply receiving part
of their wages in health insurance rather than cash. The effect on federal
tax revenues results from the fact that cash wages are taxable but insurance wages are not. Thus, as the absolute cost of health insurance fluctuates, so does the employees’ ratio of cash-to-insurance wages and, with it,
the federal government’s revenue.
Consider first the scenario in which the price of insurance decreases,
such that insurance wages decrease. Here, cash wages will increase. Employees’ taxable income will therefore increase, and the federal government’s revenue from income and payroll taxes will increase as well. On
the other hand, if the price of private insurance increases due to, say,
increases in defensive medicine or post-injury utilization rates, then employees’ insurance wages will increase; cash wages will decrease; and federal revenues will decrease.
For the 2006 fiscal year, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
the cost of all healthcare-related income tax breaks to be about $152.5
64. See Mark V. Pauly, Health Benefits at Work 33 (1997) (“The economic viewpoint
argues that anything that affects health insurance impacts workers, not their employers.”).
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billion,65 and of that $152.5 billion, the Joint Committee attributed $90.6
billion (or nearly sixty percent) to the ESI exemption.66 These figures,
however, include only foregone income taxes; they do not include foregone payroll (or “FICA”) taxes.67 Researchers at the Department of
Health and Human Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
estimated foregone payroll taxes resulting from the ESI exemption in
2006 to be an additional $73.3 billion.68 The combined cost to the federal government of these healthcare-related tax breaks, thus, was approximately $225.8 billion in 2006.
Because of these tax expenditures, the United States actually spent
more than $2.1 trillion on healthcare in 2006, and the federal government actually paid for more than 30% of 2006 health expenditures; the
$225.8 billion to subsidize private healthcare spending needs to be added
to both numerator and denominator, taking the federal government’s
2006 portion to about 39.9%.69 Of that nearly 40%, the portion attributed to tax subsidies alone was about 9.6% of total 2006 spending.
As with the 30% figure, this 9.6% figure does not necessarily prove
that the federal government’s tax policies financed 9.6% of malpracticeinduced utilization. The tax breaks apply only to private spending and
most significantly to spending on employer-sponsored insurance, so the
effect of malpractice policies on federal taxes depends on the distribution
of malpractice-related utilization among patient populations. The federal government lost revenues amounting to 9.6% of inefficient costs only
if the distribution of those costs was the same on average as the distribution of ordinary healthcare costs. I return to this point in Part II.A.3.
The important point to take from this subsection is simply that tax
breaks, once included in the national health expenditure data, raise the
federal portion of U.S. healthcare costs to about forty percent.70
65. Joint Comm., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, supra note 59, at 39–40.
66. Id. at 39. The other healthcare tax breaks are: exclusion of medical care and
TRICARE insurance for military dependents, retirees, and retiree dependents; deduction
for health insurance and long-term care insurance for the self-employed; deduction for
medical expenses and long-term care expenses; exclusion for medical benefits included in
workers’ compensation benefits; health savings accounts; exclusion of interest on state and
local government qualified private activity bonds for private nonprofit hospital facilities;
deduction for charitable contributions to health organizations; tax credit for orphan drug
research; and tax credit for purchase of health insurance by certain displaced persons. Id.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Selden & Gray, supra note 59, at 1570–71.
69. The CMS data incorrectly exclude the federal tax breaks from both federal public
and total national health expenditures. See CMS, NHE Web Tables, supra note 13, at tbl.1.
This 39.9% figure is the fraction that results from adding $225.8 billion to both the
numerator and denominator; the federal public portion of total national health
expenditures in 2006 was (707.6 + 225.8)/(2112.7 + 225.8) = 0.399145. Including the tax
expenditure as a health expenditure reduces the direct federal percentage from 33.5%, or
707.6/2112.7, to 30.2%, or 707.6/(2112.7 + 225.8).
70. This figure is the best estimate discernible from available data, but it excludes two
important categories of federal spending. First, the direct spending data from CMS
exclude public spending on federal employees’ insurance benefits, provided through the
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3. Externalization: Federal Spending on Malpractice-Related Utilization. —
Bearing in mind that the two categories of malpractice-related inefficiency are defensive medicine and post-injury care and given that the federal portion of all healthcare spending is approximately forty percent,
what can we now say about the states’ ability to externalize malpracticerelated costs onto the federal government? Although difficult to establish
with certainty, it seems likely that the states externalize something close
to the full federal portion—the full forty percent—of their malpracticeinduced healthcare costs. In other words, it seems likely that malpracticeinduced utilization costs are ordinarily distributed among patient populations (or might, in fact, be slightly more likely than average to be borne
by federally funded patients).
First, the federal government probably bears at least its average
share of inefficient costs associated with defensive medicine. Although
Medicare and Medicaid patients are less likely than other patients to sue
when injured,71 doctors probably do not discriminate among patients
when deciding whether to provide defensive services. Studies indicate
that physicians engage in unified treatment practices, failing to differentiate treatment patterns for different patient populations.72 For example,
when Medicare changed its pay structure to incentivize certain treatment
behaviors, physicians changed their behavior toward all patients, not just
Medicare patients, even though they could have profited from continuing to treat non-Medicare patients under prior patterns.73 Based on this
evidence, it seems likely that doctors provide the same rates and kinds of
defensive services to federally funded patients as to non-federally funded
patients, even though the federally funded patients are less likely to sue.
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). That spending is incorrectly
included in private spending. Second, the tax data exclude expenditures related to
nonprofit treatment of hospitals and nursing homes. The federal government has granted
favorable tax status to several healthcare organizations and has thereby foregone revenue
from those organizations.
71. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Medicare/Medicaid
Beneficiaries Account for a Relatively Small Percentage of Malpractice Losses 2 (1993),
available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149700.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (summarizing studies on incidence of malpractice claims and reporting that
“Medicare and Medicaid patients . . . are less likely than other patients to file malpractice
claims”).
72. See Laurence C. Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients, 281 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 432, 435–36
(1999) (finding managed care activity influences expenditures for nonmanaged care
patients and suggesting “physicians . . . may adopt managed care practice patterns for all
their patients”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Editorial, The Economist’s Model of Physician
Behavior, 281 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 462, 464 (1999) (arguing Baker’s findings support
hypothesis that physicians apply same practice style to all patients); cf. Judith Feder et al.,
How Did Medicare’s Prospective Payment System Affect Hospitals?, 317 New Eng. J. Med.
867, 870 (1987) (finding that introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment system
reduced average length of stay for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients, although
reductions for non-Medicare patients were “much smaller”).
73. Feder et al., supra note 72, at 870–72.
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It therefore seems likely that defensive utilization is evenly distributed
among patient populations and, as a result, that the federal government
bears its forty percent share of total defensive utilization costs.
Second, the federal government might bear slightly more than its
average share of inefficient costs associated with post-injury care. The
seminal Harvard Medical Practice Study found that patients over the age
of sixty-five are more likely than average to suffer injury from negligent
care in hospitals.74 For the elderly population, Medicare is overwhelmingly likely to pay more than forty percent of healthcare costs, including
many of the costs of post-injury utilization.75 All patients over the age of
sixty-five are eligible for Medicare coverage; about ninety-seven percent
of eligible patients are enrolled;76 and Medicare pays a high percentage
(approaching one hundred percent) of total costs for its enrollees, in74. Weiler et al., supra note 2, at 46–47, 49 tbl.3.5.
75. As of January 1, 2009, Medicare Part A (which covers hospital inpatient
reimbursements) refuses reimbursement for treatment of twenty-nine specified “never
events” (certain preventable injuries) and for treatment of three identified hospitalacquired conditions, but it continues to reimburse for treatment of iatrogenic injuries that
are not on the lists of twenty-nine never events and three conditions. See Press Release,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare and Medicaid Move Aggressively to
Encourage Greater Patient Safety in Hospitals and Reduce Never Events (July 31, 2008),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press_releases.asp (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing new rules meant to “improve the quality of care in
hospitals and reduce the number of ‘never events’”); see also Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,528 (Apr. 30, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 411–413,
422, 489 (2008)) (proposing new regulations). Medicare Parts B and C (which cover
outpatient and managed care) continue to pay for all post-injury care. The Medicaid
programs in some states have also stopped reimbursing providers for some or all of the
never events that Medicare has identified. See, e.g., Rick Valliere, Medical Errors:
Massachusetts Programs Will Not Pay for Costs Attributable to Medical Errors, 17 BNA
Health L. Rep. 877, 877 (2008) (reporting that Massachusetts stopped reimbursing for all
never events that Medicare refuses to reimburse and that Minnesota refuses payment for
some such never events); Jean DerGurahian, N.Y. Medicaid Ups the Ante, Mod.
Healthcare, June 16, 2008, at 6 (reporting that New York’s Medicaid program refuses to
pay for fourteen never events).
76. Medicare Part A covers inpatient services, Part B covers outpatient services, Part C
provides private coverage such as HMO coverage, and Part D covers prescription drugs.
Enrollment statistics vary by part, but approximately ninety-seven percent of the
population over sixty-five is enrolled in at least one Medicare plan. See Ctrs. for Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., Medicare Enrollment: National Trends 1966–2007 (2007), at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareEnRpts/Downloads/HISMI07.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting 36.25 million aged persons enrolled in Medicare in 2006); U.S.
Census Bureau, Table 2: Annual Estimates of the Population by Sex and Selected Age
Groups for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2007 (NC-EST2007-02) (2008), at
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2007-sa.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (estimating 37.25 million Americans over sixty-five as of 2006). For a
breakdown of over-sixty-five enrollment in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B, see Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Enrollment-Aged Beneficiaries (2006), at http:/
/www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareEnRpts/Downloads/06Aged.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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cluding much of the post-injury cost arising from negligent care.77 Because Medicare enrollees suffer a higher than average share of post-injury
costs and because the federal government pays more than forty percent
of Medicare enrollees’ costs, the federal government might pay more
than its average (forty percent) share of total post-injury costs. Aside
from the high risk for the over-sixty-five population, risk of negligent injury in the Harvard study’s sample group did not depend on age, income,
or payer group.78 The over-sixty-five effect, thus, is the only demonstrated distortion of injury rates and resulting spending on post-injury
care.79
Because the costs of both post-injury care and defensive utilization
seem to follow an average distribution among patients and payers, the
states can count on the federal government to pick up about forty cents
of the average dollar spent on malpractice-induced utilization. As a result, although each state internalizes the benefit to patients of defensive
utilization (such as actual and perceived increases in diagnostic accuracy)
and the benefit to hospitals of lax safety standards (such as avoided costs
of systemic precautions), the state externalizes forty percent of associated
monetary costs onto the federal government and, by extension, onto the
other forty-nine states. Put another way, if a state were to implement malpractice reforms that decreased utilization costs by one dollar, that state
could expect to gain only sixty cents; the remaining forty cents would
become federal revenue and would be dispersed among the states.
B. The Spillover Problem
What does this externalization story tell us about federal intervention
in medical malpractice policy? As in traditional spillover stories, the federalism lesson that emerges here is that the state governments will not
realize the correct (that is, the optimal) cost-benefit balance in their malpractice choices—but the federal government might. Because the states
internalize the benefits of excessive utilization but externalize a significant portion of consequent costs, the states will systematically underprovide patient safety regulations. The federal government, by contrast, internalizes the full benefit and the full cost of malpractice-related
utilization and might therefore be better positioned to choose optimal
policy outcomes.
77. See supra note 75.
78. See Weiler et al., supra note 2, at 49 tbl.3.5 (depicting effect of age on injury rates
and post-injury care spending).
79. There was evidence that self-pay patients in the Harvard study’s sample also bore a
higher than average risk of negligent injury, but the study concluded the effect was not
practically significant because it appeared to be caused not by self-paying status itself, but
by higher rates of negligence at hospitals with a higher proportion of minority patients,
who were more likely to self-pay. Harvard Med. Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and
Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York,
at 6-2 (1990), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/medmal/index.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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To support this claim, Part II.B.1 briefly outlines a foundational economic theory of federalism: Tiebout’s model of interjurisdictional competition. Part II.B.2 then returns to medical malpractice policy, demonstrating the similarities between the externalization story presented here
and the more traditional spillover stories—those that have justified federalization of environmental and antitrust laws.
1. Interjurisdictional Competition and Externalities. — The spillover justification for federalization is founded in economic theories of federalism,
starting most famously with Charles Tiebout’s model of interjurisdictional
competition. In his brief essay, Tiebout outlined the conditions under
which local governments would provide optimal levels of public goods.80
Put simply, he argued that competition among jurisdictions for resident
taxpayers (or, to use his term, “consumer-voters”) would force local governments to provide the bundle of taxes and goods that would attract the
best residents.81 In other words, Tiebout argued that interjurisdictional
competition, like perfect competition in the private market, would lead
to optimality through a kind of invisible hand mechanism.
Just as the perfect competition model for private market behavior
depends on a set of restrictive assumptions, so too does Tiebout’s model
for interjurisdictional competition. As Tiebout outlined in his essay, such
competition will create optimality only if: (1) taxpayers are mobile, and
mobility is costless; (2) taxpayers have full information about goods provided and taxes paid in competing jurisdictions; (3) there are several jurisdictions available; (4) taxpayers face no restrictions due to employment
opportunities; and (5) the public goods provided in one jurisdiction do
not impose externalities on other jurisdictions.82
As the economics and legal literatures have long recognized,
Tiebout’s fifth assumption may be the least likely to hold: Almost every
local regulation creates some externality, whether positive or negative, for
neighboring jurisdictions.83 Tiebout’s invisible hand is therefore unlikely
to work perfectly for any given public good or regulation. That point,
however, does not fully defeat Tiebout’s arguments in favor of decentrali80. Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419–21.
81. Id. at 422–23.
82. Id. at 419.
83. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust StateAction Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1221–22 (1997) [hereinafter Inman & Rubinfeld,
Making Sense] (“Interjurisdictional externalities are common in the local public
economy.”); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing public goods spillover
from one jurisdiction to another); Mark V. Pauly, Optimality, “Public” Goods, and Local
Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 572, 574–77 (1970)
(describing purely public goods between communities); Alan Williams, The Optimal
Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Government, 74 J. Pol. Econ. 18, 18 (1966)
(arguing interdependence of local communities is essential to understanding
consequences of public goods); Inman & Rubinfeld, Rethinking, supra note 17, at 46
(asserting “significant intercommunity interdependencies” weaken Tiebout’s assumption).
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zation, just as the regular failures of Adam Smith’s invisible hand do not
fully defeat arguments in favor of free private markets. Although regular
externalities might prevent decentralized authority from working as theorized, decentralization might still provide many of the advantages that
Tiebout initially identified.
That said, Tiebout also recognized that some interjurisdictional externalities (or “spillovers”) are sufficiently significant to necessitate integration of local governments.84 He offered law enforcement as an example, noting that sheriff departments and the FBI are necessary, in
addition to local police, to address criminal activity that harms multiple
localities.85
Since Tiebout wrote, scholars have identified several other policy areas that suffer from sufficiently significant spillover problems to require
greater centralization of regulatory authority. Indeed, since Tiebout
wrote, the existence of significant spillovers has become a mainstream
justification for federalization. The most frequently cited examples of
federalized regimes that arose to address such spillover problems are environmental law and antitrust law.
2. Pollution, Collusion, and Utilization. — The externalities inherent
in environmental and antitrust regulation are closely analogous to the
externalities associated with medical malpractice policy. In all three regimes, individual states internalize benefits but externalize costs associated with their specific policy choices, and in all three regimes, the predictable result is systematic underprovision of desirable regulations.
In environmental law, the problem is that a state can implement lax
environmental regulations to attract industry to the state without suffering the full environmental cost of those lax regulations; some of the resulting pollution will travel to neighboring states’ water and air supplies.
Of course, the polluting state does not externalize all costs of its regulations; some of the pollution will stay at home, and some of the state’s
citizens might suffer utility losses from environmental degradation that
occurs entirely abroad.86 The material point, though, is that the state’s
cost-benefit calculation will be systematically skewed. If a state can export
a significant portion of its pollution costs while retaining all of the associated economic benefits, then that state will systematically undersupply environmental regulation.
In antitrust law, the problem is that a state will benefit from allowing
anticompetitive behavior among businesses that produce at home but
that sell both at home and abroad. If those businesses are allowed to
84. Tiebout, supra note 17, at 423 (“In cases in which the external economies and
diseconomies are of sufficient importance, some form of integration may be indicated.”).
85. Id.
86. This utility loss could be based on purely altruistic or hedonic motivations if
citizens abstractly value environmental quality, or it could be based on more concrete
motivations if citizens are likely to travel to neighboring states and are likely to prefer a
clean environment at their travel destination.
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inflate prices artificially through anticompetitive practices, the resulting
producer surplus will stay in the producing state, but the cost of the surplus will be distributed among consumers throughout the nation. As in
the case of environmental regulation, it is unlikely that a state could externalize all costs of its businesses’ anticompetitive practices; some of
those businesses’ consumers are almost certainly residents of the same
state, and they, too, will be forced to pay the inflated price. But, again,
the material point is that the state’s cost-benefit calculation is systematically skewed, and the state will therefore predictably undersupply antitrust regulation.
The externalization story in medical malpractice follows the same
basic pattern. With respect to defensive medicine, the governing state
keeps all of the benefits to doctors and patients of allowing defensive
practices to continue. Doctors feel better shielded from liability when
they practice defensive medicine, and patients feel better cared for when
they receive defensive tests. But as discussed above, that state externalizes
forty percent of associated costs onto taxpayers throughout the nation
because the federal government picks up forty percent of the bill when
Americans overconsume defensive tests.
With respect to post-injury care, the governing state keeps all of the
benefits of lax safety standards. Hospitals and doctors save money by failing to take cost-justified precautions, especially by failing to implement
the expensive systemic precautions that would likely do the most good,
and those savings remain in the home state. But as discussed above, the
governing state externalizes the federal portion of resulting injury costs.
Of course, as in the environmental and antitrust cases, the point is
not that a state can maintain bad malpractice policies at no cost. The
state internalizes the full nonmonetary costs of causing iatrogenic injuries
and of providing unnecessary or inadequate care, such as the cost of citizens’ lost confidence in the medical system. And, of course, the state
internalizes the nonfederal share of monetary costs as well as the state’s
share of federal monetary costs. The state’s citizens pay into federal programs through federal taxes, such that some portion of the federal spending (approximately 1/50th or two percent) comes out of each state. But
as in the other cases, the material point here is that the states are able to
externalize the portion of federal monetary costs that comes from other
states, meaning that their cost-benefit calculations are predictably and systematically skewed. Because the states externalize costs while internalizing benefits, they will systematically underprovide patient safety
regulations.
In sum, in environmental law, antitrust law, and medical malpractice
law, the states’ regulatory choices will be predictably suboptimal. Because
of significant spillover problems in the relevant fields, individual states
will systematically underprovide environmental regulation, antitrust regulation, and patient safety regulation. As has been the case in environmental and antitrust law, some degree of federalization of or interstate coop-
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eration in medical malpractice policy may be necessary to correct these
problems.
III. MALPRACTICE

AND

SNOWBALLS: THE PROBLEM

OF

CAUSATION

Despite the similarities among the spillover stories in environmental,
antitrust, and medical malpractice law, there is one important difference
among them, which bears theoretical and practical significance for functional theories of federalism: Whereas the externalization of pollution
costs occurs naturally and the externalization of anticompetitive costs occurs through market forces, the externalization of healthcare costs occurs
only through preexisting federal programs—through a series of prior decisions to federalize certain kinds of healthcare spending. Medical malpractice, thus, is not a simple spillover story; it is a “snowball” story, in
which partial federalization of healthcare regulation has snowballed into
a need for further federalization of healthcare regulation.
From this causal distinction between spillover stories and snowball
stories, we can extract an important theoretical point and two practical
lessons for functional federalism. The theoretical point is that full federalization of medical malpractice regulation would present a greater
threat to federalism values, especially including the value of state sovereignty, than full federalization of environmental or antitrust regulation,
despite the three regimes’ shared instrumental justification for federal
intervention. The practical lessons are, first, that we could (but should
not, as I will explain in Part IV) eliminate the spillover problem in medical malpractice by dismantling relevant tax subsidies and spending programs and, second, that we can avoid similar snowball problems in the
future by choosing not to create limited federal programs.
Part III.A fleshes out the causal distinction between, on the one
hand, the spillover stories in environmental and antitrust law and, on the
other hand, the snowball story in medical malpractice law. Part III.B distinguishes the snowball story from two more common explanations for
the federal government’s continual growth: centralization creep and empire building. Part III.C considers the theoretical and practical significance of the distinction between spillovers and snowballs.
A. Spillovers Versus Snowballs
The critical distinction between the spillover stories and the snowball
story rests in the differing externalization mechanisms. In environmental
law, that mechanism is the natural reality that pollution travels. In antitrust law, the externalization mechanism is less natural (in the denotative
sense) but equally unavoidable; it is the flow of goods across state lines.
Because local specialization and trade are mutually beneficial and ultimately inevitable, no state will internalize all the costs of its residents’
anticompetitive behavior; some of those costs will travel to and be borne
by out-of-state consumers. As a result, the states are naturally and inevita-
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bly ill-suited to regulate anticompetitive conduct, just as they are naturally
and inevitably ill-suited to regulate pollution.
But in medical malpractice, the externalization mechanism is
neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Externalization of malpractice-related costs occurs only through preexisting, partial federal programs—
which arose and remained more by sticky historical accident than by coherent federalist justification. The need for federalization of medical
malpractice arises solely from prior decisions (and historically accidental
decisions) to federalize portions of healthcare spending.
The most significant healthcare tax break—the ESI exemption87—
was enacted during World War II as a means of curbing wage inflation
during a time of labor scarcity.88 The intention of the tax exemption was
to incentivize employers to use benefits rather than wages to attract employees. In that rarified labor market, the risk of wage inflation justified
federal regulation since interjurisdictional competition for scarce labor
could have harmed the national economy in a typical “race to the bottom”; in the wartime economy, each state would have had an incentive to
underprovide inflation controls since higher wages would attract scarce
employees. But once the labor market restabilized after the war, the
need for benefits-based (as opposed to cash-based) wages disappeared, as
did the need for federal regulation of private wage packaging decisions.
But by the time the labor market had restabilized, the habit of providing
private health insurance as an employee benefit and the presence of federal tax breaks to subsidize that habit had taken over U.S. healthcare.89
And they stuck. It was thus mere historical accident that employer-sponsored insurance became the primary model for private health insurance
in the United States—and sticky historical accident that the federal government became a major contributor to the private market through federal tax subsidies.
Similarly, the Medicare and Medicaid programs—at least in their
current form as partial programs rather than full public insurance programs—lack coherent justification under functional theories of federalism; like the ESI subsidy, those programs arose by political and historical
accident and simply stuck. When passed in 1965, Medicare and Medicaid
were intended to be the first steps in an incremental climb to national
health insurance.90 Although full nationalization of public health insurance would be functionally justified, there is no reason that insurance for
the poor, the elderly, and the disabled should be regulated at the federal
level while insurance for everyone else should be regulated at the state
87. See supra Part II.A.2.
88. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—
Origins and Implications, 355 New Eng. J. Med. 82, 83 (2006).
89. Id.
90. Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Medicare Approach: Political Choice and American
Institutions, 32 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 159, 160 (2007).
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level.91 Rather, those patient groups became the starting point in an
agenda for national public insurance simply because they were the most
sympathetic. But national insurance still has not passed. Medicare and
Medicaid have simply stuck in their original form as limited federal programs, which are good and popular programs but which still—and arbitrarily from a federalism point of view—assist only the discrete populations that first enrolled. As a result, the federal government lacks a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for healthcare, leaving large chunks of
regulatory authority in the hands of the states.
Of course, I do not mean to imply that the 1965 federal government
was entirely misguided in tackling the problem of public health insurance. If we want health insurance to be provided publicly rather than
privately, then federal control of such a program might well be better
than state control since the federal government benefits from economies
of scale and since the states might engage in a race to the bottom, attempting to avoid sick residents by underproviding public insurance.92
The basic federalism logic behind Medicare and Medicaid, thus, is sound,
and the programs themselves are generally beneficial and popular. The
problem with the programs—the characteristic of Medicare and
Medicaid that arose and remained by historical accident and the characteristic that is responsible for the malpractice spillover—is that they limit
federal power to the provision and regulation of public insurance for a
few discrete patient groups, leaving significant power over healthcare regulation (including full power over medical malpractice regulation) in the
hands of the states. That division of labor between state and federal governments was not well planned when Congress passed Medicare and
Medicaid; it arose from political compromises. And it is that division of
labor—that disjuncture between financial and regulatory control over
malpractice-induced utilization—that creates the malpractice spillover.
Without the historically accidental partialness of the federal programs, we
would not have the snowball problem identified here.
B. Snowballing Versus Creeping and Conquering
It is important to distinguish here between the federalization snowball effect and the “centralization creep” and “empire building”93 effects.
Scholars have long noted that the federal government (like many other
91. Federal rather than state regulation of public insurance might be functionally
justified. In a Tiebout competition, the states might underprovide public insurance if they
believe that robust state-sponsored healthcare would attract sick residents.
92. See Alice M. Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States, and
the Federal Government 177–82 (1992) (discussing which tasks and responsibilities are
appropriate for federal and state undertaking).
93. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 915, 940 (2005) (discussing whether empire building behavior of federal and
state governments is main problem of federalism).
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institutions) simply tends to grow rather than shrink.94 Our national history is one of steady motion towards greater centralization, with very few
moments of devolving power to the states. Some scholars attribute this
tendency to federal agents’ active desire to expand their power at the
expense of state power (empire building),95 while others hypothesize that
agents simply have a psychological aversion to shrinkage (centralization
creep).96 An important assumption underlying both of these theories of
federal growth is that the relevant expansions of federal power are not
functionally justified. Scholars have long assumed that the federal government expands because the relevant decisionmakers simply have some
personal preference for greater federalization.
The snowball effect is somewhat similar in that creeping, conquering, and snowballing all begin with an initial—and presumably innocent—decision to federalize, and that initial decision eventually spirals
into greater federalization. In all three scenarios, the federal government
starts small and then gradually takes over more policy space from the
states.
But the snowball effect is importantly different in terms of functional
justification. Indeed, the most significant scholarly payoff of identifying
the snowball effect is not the recognition that partial federalization leads
to greater federalization; it is the recognition that partial federalization
creates a concrete need for greater federalization. When responding to a
snowball scenario, the federal government expands not to build an empire or to avoid the embarrassment of shrinkage but to fix a concrete
problem of state governance that prior federal programs have created.97
C. Snowballs and Federalism
The causal distinction between the spillover story and the snowball
story is important to both federalism theory and federalism practice. The
94. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other
Organizations, 18 J. Corp. L. 333, 334 (1993) (“[T]here is a kind of ratcheting, or
irreversibility, in the evolution of a firm such that it is easier to expand than to contract.”).
95. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 112–17 (2001).
96. Levmore, supra note 94, at 337.
97. Of course, if the federal programs that give rise to the snowball problem
themselves arise from empire building, then a federal response to the snowball could be
considered part of that same attempt to build an empire. That is, if we imagine that the
1965 Congress simply wanted to grab state power when it passed Medicare and Medicaid,
then federalization of malpractice regulation to fix the snowball could be considered a
further empire build—another mere grab of state power—even though the snowball
provides a solid functional justification for federalization; if that were the case, then we
should prefer dismantling Medicare and Medicaid to federalization of malpractice as a
response to the snowball problem. As I noted supra Part III.A and as I will discuss further
infra Part IV.B.1, however, Medicare and Medicaid were not mere power grabs; they were
based (at least in part) on sound federalist logic. As a result, federalization of malpractice
is not an entrenchment of power grabbing or a further power grab; it is a reasonable
response to the mistaken partialness of federal regulatory control.
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distinction matters in theory because it indicates that federalization of
medical malpractice poses a greater threat to state sovereignty than federalization of environmental law and antitrust law. In theory, the federal
government should take over a regulatory regime only if the states, as
sovereigns, would collectively agree that federalization is in their best interest. And when a snowball creates the functional need for federalization, it is not clear that federalization is the solution that independent
sovereigns would prefer.
From a practical perspective, the distinction matters for two reasons.
First, it illuminates a different solution—other than federalization—to
the externalization problem in medical malpractice. Rather than federalizing patient safety regulation, we could devolve authority over healthcare
financing to the states in order to realign their incentives to regulate malpractice. Second, the causal distinction serves as a cautionary tale. In the
future, we could avoid these federalization snowballs by choosing not to
create limited federal programs like Medicare and Medicaid.
1. Theoretical Lesson: State Sovereignty. — The Tiebout line of scholarship illuminates the functional benefits of decentralization and a functional justification for federalization,98 but it does not fully take account
of noninstrumental federalism values that matter in law and legal theory,
especially the values of state sovereignty and political participation.
When considering federalization of a regulatory power that has traditionally resided in the states, we must remember that federal power is, constitutionally, a delegated power; the states, as sovereigns, voluntarily relinquished some of their authority—some of their sovereignty—to a central
government when they entered the union. But they did not give up their
sovereign status. Functional expediency, thus, does not suffice to justify
federalization.99 Rather, we must also consider whether the states as sovereigns have agreed or would agree to delegate the relevant authority to
the central government.
In a traditional spillover scenario, the answer to that question should
be a straightforward “yes.” If the relevant regulatory regime is one that
the states will not govern effectively on their own because their individual
cost-benefit calculations are significantly skewed, then centralization is
straightforwardly in the states’ collective best interest. In environmental
and antitrust regulation, for example, the states collectively are better off
when law reflects the national cost-benefit balance. Because of the inherent externalization problems in those two regimes, interstate coordination is simply necessary to achieve the right balance. And, of course, the
established constitutional structure for that interstate coordination is fed98. For discussion of Tiebout’s scholarship, see supra Part II.B.1.
99. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Toward an Economic Theory of Federal Jurisdiction,
6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 41, 41–42 (1982) (“[T]he relationship between the states and the
federal government cannot be regarded solely as an expedient one, designed to promote
efficiency and hence alterable from time to time . . . .”).
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eralization.100 The sovereign states agreed, through the constitutional
compact, to delegate power to the federal government when individual
retention of that power would make them collectively worse off, and the
spillover scenarios are straightforward examples of regimes that require
such delegations.
But in a snowball scenario, it is much less clear that the sovereign
states, if actually acting as independent sovereigns at a bargaining table,
would or should agree to delegate the relevant power to the federal government. At this point, of course, the states are just as incapable of effectively regulating medical malpractice as they are of effectively regulating
pollution, but that deficiency is not inherent: The reason that the states
are bad at governing patient safety is that the federal government has
made them so. And the prior federalization decisions were not clearly
good or necessary from the perspective of either functional federalism or
state sovereignty; rather, Medicare, Medicaid, and the ESI exemption
were somewhat arbitrary federalization decisions that simply stuck. Further federalization, thus, would not be a solution to a natural federalism
problem; it would be a further entrenchment of a prior federalism mistake—namely, the federal subsidization of private insurance and the partialness of federal control over public insurance.
In short, the theoretical lesson is that federalization could be seen as
a greater threat to state sovereignty when the states are not naturally or
inherently ill-suited to perform the relevant regulatory function. The
states might rationally prefer to fix their incentive and coordination
problems without relinquishing their sovereign powers if such a fix is
available.
2. Practical Payoffs: Solving and Avoiding Snowballs.
a. Solving the Snowball. — In a snowball scenario, of course, an alternative to federalization is available for solving the states’ externalization
and coordination problems. Rather than federalizing another chunk of
healthcare regulation, we could return currently federalized funding responsibilities to the states, fixing rather than entrenching the sticky federalization decisions of the past. If the states were paying for all healthcare
utilization, then their incentives to govern medical malpractice would no
longer be skewed, and interstate coordination or integration would no
longer be necessary.
The first practical payoff of the snowball story, thus, is the recognition that we now face a decision between federalizing medical malpractice and devolving healthcare spending. Instead of giving the federal government the power to govern malpractice standards, we could dismantle
the Medicare and Medicaid programs and eliminate the healthcare tax
subsidies at the federal level. The result would be that state-created
healthcare savings arising from malpractice reforms would no longer flow
100. In Part IV, I discuss the possibility of interstate coordination through
mechanisms other than the federal legislature.
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into federal coffers. The externalization problem would thus disappear,
as would any need for federalization of malpractice regulation. (Of
course, this solution has its own impracticalities and federalism
problems—and might even be impossible to accomplish—as I will discuss
in Part IV.)
b. Avoiding Future Snowballs. — The second practical payoff of the
snowball story is the recognition that federalization snowballs are avoidable. Snowball scenarios arise solely from decisions to federalize parts—
and only parts—of regulatory regimes. If federalization decisions were all
or nothing, then we would never see snowball-style externalization
problems. The federal government would never pick up mere portions
of the states’ regulatory costs and would therefore never motivate the
states to underprovide cost-saving regulations.
The point here is not that full-fledged national health insurance
would have prevented a need for federalization of medical malpractice
standards—quite the opposite. The point is that we should have known,
when creating Medicare and Medicaid, that even those partial programs
would eventually give rise to a need for federalization of malpractice.101
If we had recognized that eventuality at the time and had either federalized the whole healthcare system (including medical malpractice) or
none of it, then we could have avoided thirty years of costly but ineffectual malpractice reform efforts in the states—costly efforts that eventually
need to be replicated at the federal level anyway. Additionally, if federalization decisions were all or nothing, then the political fallout of federalizing malpractice standards would have affected the Congress that was actually responsible for that decision—the 1965 Congress—rather than
affecting Congresses decades later.
Of course, the decision between federalizing all or federalizing nothing should itself be based on solid functional federalism logic, so the
1965 Congress should have passed national health insurance only if there
had been federalist justification for such a move. As noted in Part III.A
and later in Part IV.B.1, though, such justification existed then and exists
still today since federal control of public insurance would benefit from
economies of scale and would avoid a race to the bottom. The federal
101. This point is clear enough when Congress considers national health insurance
today. For example, when Congress debated national health insurance in 1993, the
relevant bill included comprehensive medical malpractice standards. Health Security Act,
H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1994); see also Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., Medical
Malpractice Provisions of the President’s Proposed Health Security Act: A Legal Analysis
5–14 (1994) (describing provisions of proposed Health Security Act with pilot program
establishing practice guidelines). Congress and President Clinton recognized that full
federalization of healthcare funding would require federalization of medical malpractice
as well. See Schwartz, Proper Federal Role, supra note 8, at 924 (“In short, a federal
takeover of the system of delivering medical services would carry with it a justification for
federal control of malpractice rules. But the Clinton bill, proposing such a federal plan,
went down to a resounding political defeat.”).
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government, thus, ought to have taken—and ought now to take—full
control over healthcare regulation, including malpractice regulation.
IV. FIXING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
What, then, should we do to resolve the snowball problem in medical
malpractice? The right answer surely is not that we should dismantle federal programs and subsidies in order to put financial control and financial incentives back in the hands of the states. Also, a more positive financial solution such as a grants-based attempt to realign the states’ financial
incentives does not seem possible here since the necessary level of the
federal grant would be impossible to determine. Substantive federalization therefore seems necessary to correct the snowball problem in medical malpractice. That said, such a federalized regime can and should be
structured to promote benefits of decentralization, such as competition
and experimentation, by allowing waivers to states102 and by funding
demonstration projects.103 This approach would allow the federal government to try a variety of the academy’s second-generation reform ideas.
To support this proposal, Part IV.A briefly outlines a continuum of
federalism values, including the economic, political, and legal values that
trade off of one another as we move from decentralized to centralized
decisionmaking. Part IV.B then considers five options for interstate cooperation in medical malpractice policy—program repeals, interstate bargaining, block grants, categorical grants, and full federalization—settling
on federalization as the necessary solution here but endorsing waivers
and demonstration projects as means of maintaining some decentralization values.
A. Federalism Values
Federalism scholars have long acknowledged a set of core values that
will be served either by state-based or by federal-level decisionmaking in a
particular regulatory regime—values that trade off as the degree of centralization changes. The set includes virtues of decentralization, such as
state sovereignty, and virtues of centralization, such as uniformity.
1. Virtues of Decentralization. — On one hand, there are theoretical
and instrumental virtues of state-based decisionmaking that counsel in
favor of decentralization. As discussed above in Part III.C.1, state sovereignty is one such virtue, guiding both the formal constitutionality and
102. Waivers would allow individual states to deviate from federal substantive
requirements and systems in order to try alternatives. The Medicaid Program, for
example, includes a waiver provision that allows the states to deviate from federal
substantive requirements of the Medicaid Act in order to try alternative approaches to
public health insurance. See Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000).
103. Demonstration projects would be federally funded and centrally administered
experiments with various approaches to medical malpractice. The Medicare Program, for
example, occasionally runs temporary demonstration projects to try different payment
structures.
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political appropriateness of congressional action. Interstate competition
(as Tiebout identified) is another virtue, possibly allowing an “invisible
hand” mechanism to play a role in the optimization of public goods and
taxes. A decentralized system might be more likely than a centralized
system to achieve optimal allocation of resources for citizens’ welfare.104
Other virtues of decentralization include political participation, experimentation, and (perhaps) tradition.
Decentralization allows for greater political participation by putting
decisionmaking power in the hands of a smaller government.105 Because
smaller governments represent fewer people, they give their citizens
greater voice in determining policy outcomes. In the case of medical
malpractice, we might favor state-based decisionmaking as a means of ensuring that patients, for example—who are dispersed and unorganized—
have the strongest chance to represent their interests against those of
organized doctors and lawyers. Such unorganized interests have a better
chance of getting the attention of state representatives than federal representatives. Relatedly, decentralization allows differing interests and preferences to be represented differently across jurisdictions. Citizens of
Alabama can choose one approach to malpractice reform while citizens
of Vermont choose another.
State-based decisionmaking also allows for experimentation with a
variety of policy solutions. If Alabama tries caps on damages while
Vermont tries enterprise liability, we might gain valuable information
about the successes and failures of each approach. Justice Brandeis provided the most famous acknowledgement of this virtue, referring to the
states as laboratories for social and economic experimentation.106 Without such experimentation, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether alternative dispute resolution, for example, would be an
improvement over traditional malpractice litigation for deterring negligence and compensating victims.
Finally, we might consider the value of tradition. As noted above,
tort litigation has long been the province of state courts—a traditional
common law field. Centralized, statutory medical malpractice reform
would be a dramatic departure from our legal system’s history. Although
tradition does not, in itself, provide any instrumental justification for one
approach or another, the existence of a long tradition often correlates
with reliance interests and institutional experience, both of which might
be worth preserving for instrumental reasons. We might not want to
change the malpractice system in a way that puts large numbers of lawyers
104. See supra Part II.B.1.
105. See Inman & Rubinfeld, Making Sense, supra note 83, at 1215–17 (noting
evidence supporting theory that smaller government increases citizen influence and
participation).
106. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”).
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out of work, for example, and we might not want to change it in a way
that requires creation of new institutions that serve essentially (or exactly)
the same functions as existing institutions. By giving regulatory authority
to the federal government instead of the state governments, we risk these
kinds of costly departures from tradition.
2. Virtues of Centralization. — On the other hand, centralization has
virtues that need to be considered. As noted above, uniformity of legal
standards is one such virtue for some regulatory regimes.107 While variability across state lines allows different political preferences to be represented in different jurisdictions and allows experimentation with multiple
regulatory approaches, that variability also requires individuals and businesses that operate across state lines to conform their behavior to several
legal standards, which can be costly. As noted in Part I.B.2, however, uniformity does not seem to be a necessary or important goal for medical
malpractice policy. Because the relevant industries are localized, there is
no need to create uniformity of medical malpractice standards; doctors,
insurance writers, and lawyers tend to run state-specific businesses.
Correction of interstate externalities is, of course, another virtue of
centralization108—and the one that motivates this Essay’s call for federalization of medical malpractice reform. Because the federal government
represents every state and every citizen, it internalizes both the full national cost and the full national benefit of policy choices. In medical malpractice policy, the federal government internalizes the full cost of excessive utilization not solely because it pays for some such utilization itself
but also because it represents all of the people who pay for the rest.
The virtues of centralization for political participation are simply
mirror images of the identified political participation virtues of decentralization. Because the federal government represents more people and because federal officials are harder to contact than state officials, they will
be less accessible not only to disorganized interests like patients but also
to organized interests like doctors and lawyers.109 Federal officials might
therefore be less susceptible than state officials to lobbying pressures and
might, as a result, be more likely to represent the public interest.110
Finally, there is an administrative advantage to centralization. Decision costs are lower if there is only one governmental unit in charge of
107. See supra Part I.B.2.b; see also David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 48–49
(1995) (noting taxes, emergency relief, and professional activities as ideal areas to have
uniformity).
108. See Shapiro, supra note 107, at 40–41 (exposing extreme externalities in areas
where states independently regulate private activity).
109. See, e.g., id. at 45 (positing expansive singular government prevents any one
party or interest from exercising completely selfish power); see also The Federalist No. 10
(James Madison) (arguing broad democracy is best means to guard against small powerful
factions and special interests).
110. The balance here is still debated among public choice theorists. See Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 13–17 (1991)
(explaining possible impact of interest groups in state and federal settings).
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the regulatory regime. If the federal government takes charge, then communication and bargaining among the states become unnecessary, and
communication and bargaining between the state and federal governments become less necessary.111 Particularly in a spillover regime, the
administrative costs of interstate bargaining can be high, and in a snowball regime, the administrative costs of bargaining between the state and
federal governments can be high.
B. Regulatory Options
Given this set of federalism values, the next question is how to approach medical malpractice regulation in a way that best balances the
competing virtues of centralization and decentralization. One option, as
previously noted, would be to dismantle existing federal programs in order to eliminate the externalization effects that motivate my call for federalization. But there is also a range of alternative options—involving
varying degrees of centralized authority—for fixing the externalization
problems without eliminating existing programs.
In order of least centralization to greatest:
• States could decide among themselves how to set malpractice
standards, allowing the states to fix their own externalization
problems without bestowing any additional authority on the
federal government.
• The federal government could provide block grants to the
states, financing medical malpractice reform without issuing
any substantive requirements for reform implementation.
• The federal government could provide categorical grants to
the states, financing medical malpractice reform while imposing certain statutory requirements on the substance of the
states’ reforms.
• The federal government could take full control of medical
malpractice law, implementing preemptive patient safety standards and taking power entirely out of the hands of the states.
Although a grants approach is tempting because it is a financial solution to a financial problem, the right level of such grants would be impossible to calculate.112 I therefore propose full federalization as the necessary approach to solving the snowball in this case. In order to preserve
some of the competition and experimentation benefits of decentralization, however, I also endorse federally granted waivers and federally
funded demonstration projects.
1. Dismantling Federal Programs. — The first option for eliminating
the snowball would be to dismantle the federal programs through which
the states externalize malpractice-related costs: Medicare, Medicaid,
111. Shapiro, supra note 107, at 46–48 (discussing specific instances of emergency
relief and revenue raising where federal government’s unilateral actions led to more
effective outcomes).
112. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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SCHIP, the ESI subsidy, and many others. In some ways, this option
might seem to be the one that is most consistent with federalism’s decentralization values, identified above. Given that the federal programs—at
least in their current form—arose and remained largely by historical accident,113 it is not obvious that they currently serve any federalism values at
all.
But there are at least two reasons to disfavor this approach even in
the absence of federalism justifications, and there is at least one federalism justification for keeping the spending programs. The first non-federalism reason for maintaining existing federal programs is the need to preserve reliance interests. Millions of Americans count on Medicare,
Medicaid, and the ESI subsidy for their health insurance or even for their
employment. Although it might be possible to wean the country from
that reliance over time, the medical malpractice snowball problem is
probably not significant enough to justify that kind and degree of disruption, especially if the snowball can be fixed by less disruptive means.
Second and relatedly, dismantling Medicare would be politically impossible. Although Medicaid is not particularly well liked and although
employers are tiring of their role in U.S. health insurance such that the
ESI subsidy could perhaps be repealed, the Medicare program is wildly
popular.114 And its constituency—the over-sixty-five population—is well
organized and politically powerful. A repeal of Medicare, thus, would be
simply impossible to pass. Given that Medicare is the largest federal
healthcare program, we could not fix the snowball problem without repealing Medicare, and there does not seem to be any politically feasible
way to do so.
The federalism justification for maintaining federal spending programs is based on the federalism logic for national public insurance, discussed in Part III.A. Because public health insurance would benefit from
economies of scale and might suffer from a race to the bottom if governed by the states, the federal government should be the one in charge
of any public health insurance program we create. Although the current
division of labor—with the federal government running public insurance
only for the poor and the elderly and the states maintaining control over
private insurance for the rest of the population—was accidental and remains nonsensical under federalism logic, the idea of federal control over
public health insurance is generally sound. One reason for maintaining
Medicare and Medicaid, thus, might be the hope that they will one day
fulfill their intended purpose as incremental steps on the path to a comprehensive national regime (a “Medicare for All”). Medicare and
Medicaid today do not serve federalism values at all, but if they could be
expanded, they would.
113. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
114. Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1095, 1100 (2003) (noting that Medicare is considered the most successful innovation of
the welfare state).
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In sum, dismantling federal programs would be costly if not impossible, and that approach might not lead us to the best final result for
healthcare federalism in the United States. Repeal of existing tax and
spending programs seems unnecessary, difficult, and unwise. It is surely
not the best option.
2. Interstate Bargaining. — Among options for fixing the snowball
problem without dismantling existing programs, the one that requires the
smallest degree of centralization is interstate bargaining. This option is
premised on a Coasean retort to the entire federalism debate. The
Coasean tautology teaches us that, if transaction costs are zero, then parties will bargain to the most efficient result.115 Legal rules and entitlements will not, therefore, affect the ultimate state of the world as long as
parties can bargain freely. Well, the federal and state governments are
parties that are capable of bargaining, so why should we expect rules governing the relative powers of the state and federal governments to affect
the ultimate division of labor between and among them? If a particular
regulatory result or division of labor is optimal and if transaction costs are
zero, then the federal and state governments will bargain their way to that
result regardless of any legal attempts to sway them.116
In the case of medical malpractice, this approach theoretically could
work because the states collectively internalize the full cost-benefit balance
of malpractice policy choices. The federal revenues that pay for states’
malpractice costs, of course, start in the states’ pockets. The federal government is not separate from the state governments; it is the collection of
all fifty state governments. And federal healthcare spending is not separate from state healthcare spending; the citizens of Alaska (along with the
citizens of the other forty-nine states) pay for Medicare and Medicaid just
like they pay for state-funded healthcare and private healthcare. The
states collectively, thus, should want to enact robust malpractice reforms
in order to minimize their citizens’ federal taxes. The problem that prevents them from enacting optimal reforms in the present climate is, in
important respects, nothing more than a collective action problem. If
the states could gather and bargain, they could pass optimal regulations.
The problem with this approach, of course, is that transaction costs
are not zero. Bargaining is not free. Indeed, bargains among the fifty
states, without federalized coordination, could be extremely costly. The
primary problem is not that the states lack a forum for communication;
state legislators and governors regularly come together in, for example,
the National Conference of State Legislatures and the National
Governors Association, and those organizations probably could facilitate
bargaining among the states.
115. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
116. Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 Const.
Comment. 141, 142 (1996) (explaining legal rules, including rules governing state
sovereignty and federal power, are unimportant when cost of bargaining is negligible).
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But the problems would begin once the fifty sovereigns sat down at a
table. Most significantly, the problem with bargaining is that without formalized mechanisms for discussion and voting—like those that are institutionalized in the national legislature—it would be difficult for the states
to find and agree to a solution to the snowball problem.117 By definition,
an efficient bargain creates an economic surplus, and for a voluntary bargain to work, the parties must be able to agree on a division of that surplus. Such agreements are hard enough to reach when two parties try to
divide a single pie; it might be impossible to come to an agreement when
fifty parties try to divide multiple pies.118 Furthermore, the states would
have incentives to misrepresent their interests, and there would be
problems of unequal bargaining power.119
Of course, the Framers were aware of these problems with interstate
bargaining, and they designed Congress to correct them as effectively as
possible. The Senate, for example, is specifically designed to correct unequal bargaining power; electoral politics are meant to force revelation of
preferences; and established voting rules fix the difficulties in dividing
the pie. The cheapest mechanism for interstate agreements, thus, is federalized voting in Congress.
3. Block Grants. — The second least intrusive option for fixing the
snowball problem without dismantling federal programs would be for the
federal government to provide the states with block grants;120 we could
simply pay the states to enact malpractice reforms. This option, if it could
be implemented correctly, would solve the snowball problem by ensuring
that each state gained a monetary benefit—in the form of a federal
grant—to compensate for the externalized savings of malpractice reforms. In the current system, each state expects to recover only sixty
cents of every dollar saved through medical malpractice reform, while
expecting the federal government to recover the remaining forty
cents.121 If the federal government offered those forty cents back to the
state in the form of a block grant, then the state would once again have a
full incentive to invest in medical malpractice reforms.
117. See Shapiro, supra note 107, at 41 (pointing to lack of sufficient resources as
deterrent to agreement in complex governmental bargaining processes); Inman &
Rubinfeld, Making Sense, supra note 83, at 1224–25 (noting political motivations of
different jurisdictions likely to interfere with fair or efficient bargaining process).
118. See, e.g., Inman & Rubinfeld, Making Sense, supra note 83, at 1224 (elaborating
on increased likelihood bargaining process will break down as more actors are involved
and have competing interests).
119. See id. at 1222–24 (discussing five potential problems facing bargaining efforts
between governments).
120. See generally Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 65–105 (1972) (discussing
economic theory and empirical use of intergovernmental grants); Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan
S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested
Terrain, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 297, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 297, 300–06 (1996) (Joint
Symposium Issue) (defining block grants and discussing their operation).
121. For the derivation of this ratio, see supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.

R
R
R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-4\COL405.txt

886

unknown

Seq: 43

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

23-APR-09

7:41

[Vol. 109:844

Because it would allow each state to choose its own approach to reform, this option would preserve the competition and experimentation
benefits of decentralized decisionmaking; it would preserve the states’
sovereign authority over the substance of medical malpractice policy; it
would fix the snowball problem without requiring a costly bargaining process among the states; and it would keep decisionmaking power at a lower
level of government so as to allow greater political participation by all
interested parties. The only previously identified federalism value that
would not be served by a functioning block grants regime would be the
uniformity interest, and as noted, that interest is not a strong one in medical malpractice policy.122 In theory, therefore, block grants are an extremely appealing option.
But there is a prohibitive practical problem with block grants: The
real dollar level of the grant would be nearly impossible to determine. In
order to fix the externality, the federal government would need to figure
out how much money the state was likely to save through malpractice
reform and would need to offer a grant amounting to forty percent of
that total. Given the difficulties in fashioning and evaluating cost-saving
malpractice reforms, that project would be nearly impossible as a predictive matter and might, in fact, be quite difficult even as an evaluative matter after the state policy had been implemented. The federal government would not, therefore, be able to offer an effective block grant
before the state implemented its policy and probably would have a hard
time offering an effective grant even after the state implemented its
policy.
The only way for the federal government to set a reasonable grant
level would be for it to conduct an independent substantive evaluation of
particular malpractice reforms and the savings one could expect from
those reforms. States that accepted grants would then be required to enact those particular reforms. That system, however, would be a categorical grants system rather than a block grants system, which I will discuss in
the next section.
4. Categorical Grants. — The third most intrusive option would be for
the federal government to provide grants that are conditional on substantive requirements for their use. The federal government could agree to
finance malpractice reforms contingent on the states’ compliance with
federal statutory criteria. This option would correct the snowball problem in the same way that the block grants would, by providing a monetary
benefit to compensate for externalized savings, but unlike block grants, a
categorical grants regime would give the federal government substantive
regulatory authority to guide the states’ malpractice policy choices. This
substantive authority might help the federal government to calibrate
grant levels because it would give the government authority to condition
grants on the states’ enactment of those policy designs that are most
122. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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likely to create savings. The federal government could examine a variety
of reform options, estimate future savings or measure captured savings,
and then offer grants to states that are willing to enact those reform options. This possibility still would be difficult in practice since savings
would remain difficult to calculate, but the substantive authority would
allow the federal government to tangle with a much smaller set of reform
options.
Even if it worked as theorized, a categorical grants regime would, of
course, represent a degree of incursion on state sovereignty, but the incursion would not be as great as a fully preemptive federal statute. Substantive requirements attached to categorical grants would bind only
those states that voluntarily accept grant money, so the states could ignore federal standards—and thereby retain full sovereignty over malpractice policy—simply by turning down the federal money. Of course, allowing the federal government to take even partial substantive control
over malpractice policy could weaken the competition and experimentation virtues of decentralization. Interstate competition will be weaker if
federal legislation mandates interjurisdictional uniformity of certain policy issues that matter to taxpayers, and experimentation might be weaker
if federal legislation prevents the states from enacting a policy option that
they would otherwise want to try. Partial federalization of malpractice
policy substance would also weaken the political participation and tradition advantages of decentralization; certain substantive issues would become the province of a larger, harder-to-contact government, and that
government would lack institutional experience with substantive tort
issues.
Some of these basic problems with substantive intrusion could be
minimized by designing federal policy to avoid them. For example, the
federal government could allow waivers for states that want to experiment, and it could leave most quotidian administration to preexisting
state institutions in order to preserve the advantages of institutional experience and to allow accessible state officials to have some power to respond to constituent suggestions and complaints.
As with block grants, however, there are practical reasons to be wary
of categorical grants (even if they are more likely than block grants to
work as theorized), which we have learned from our experience with the
Medicaid program. Even carefully designed categorical grants tend to
allow so much agency slack between state and federal governments that
their intended operation regularly fails.123 Federal administrators prove
to be poor watchdogs of state agencies, and state agencies prove to be
poor agents of federal policy. This kind of cooperative federalism has not
123. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 110 (2005)
(defining agency slack as “tendency of government regulators to underenforce certain
statutory requirements because of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or the
laziness or self-interest of the regulators themselves”).
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been a successful model for federalization. I therefore hesitate to endorse such a plan.
5. Full Federalization. — The final option—and the most intrusive on
state sovereignty—would be for the federal government to pass preemptive medical malpractice reforms, as Congress nearly did with the
HEALTH Act of 2003.124 Preemptive federal legislation would solve the
snowball problem by requiring the states to provide an adequate level of
patient safety regulation. Regardless of whether federal legislation simply
created a floor for state standards—as the HEALTH Act would have
done125—or instead replaced all state standards with federal standards,
preemptive legislation would correct the externalization problem by requiring at least a minimum level of patient protection. Both floor-setting
federal legislation and fully preemptive federal legislation would prevent
the states from undersupplying patient safety standards.
Preemptive federal legislation, of course, might threaten several federalism values. First, it obviously poses a greater threat to state sovereignty than grants since it fully strips the states of authority over their
malpractice policy choices. Second, even a floor-setting statute significantly weakens interjurisdictional competition by limiting the states’ options. A floor-setting statute might also serve as a cognitive anchor for the
states’ policy choices, limiting their creativity in the competition.126
Third, any federal legislation that did not include a robust waiver provision would prevent the states from experimenting with alternative reforms. Fourth, preemptive legislation would weaken the states’ political
accountability for malpractice choices and would take control out of the
hands of the more accessible state legislature. And, finally, federal tort
reform would depart from the tradition of the common law of torts and
would place authority in the hands of federal institutions that lack experience with the regime.
As with categorical grants, it might be possible to avoid some of these
pitfalls by designing the federal legislation with federalism values in
mind. For example, federal legislation could preserve the value of experimentation either by providing waivers to the states so that they can deviate from federal substantive regulations to experiment with alternatives
or by funding federal demonstration projects so that the federal govern124. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003,
H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). The HEALTH Act would have federalized all of the firstgeneration reforms that the states have tried thus far. It would not, therefore, have done
much by way of bolstering patient safety standards in the states. Nevertheless, it provides a
model of preemptive legislation and demonstrates that Congress has actively considered
such legislation in recent years.
125. Cohen, Medical Malpractice Liability Reform, supra note 36, at 2–3
(summarizing provisions of HEALTH Act).
126. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:
Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of
Intuitive Judgment 120, 120–21 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds.,
2002) (defining cognitive anchors and surveying empirical evidence of their effect).
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ment can run its own controlled experiments with alternative regulatory
approaches.127 Indeed, federally funded and federally controlled demonstration projects might provide better, clearer information than state
controlled experimentation since sample groups could be based on relevant characteristics rather than state boundaries, which are entirely arbitrary from the perspective of malpractice policy.
In short, a preemptive federal law seems necessary since a grantsbased approach would be difficult to administer. But such a law should
be designed to preserve as many benefits of decentralization as possible,
allowing waivers to preserve interstate competition and funding demonstration projects to promote experimentation. Although this approach
represents the greatest threat to state sovereignty, it seems to be the only
approach (other than the costly and politically impossible option of dismantling existing programs) that could actually melt the medical malpractice snowball.
This proposal does not include any recommendations for the substance of federally implemented reforms. There is already an extensive
literature that develops options for second-generation reforms, including
proposals for alternative dispute resolution, enterprise liability, no-fault
insurance, administrative adjudication (or “health courts”), and uniform
practice standards.128 Through either legislative or executive implementation, the federal government could try a variety of these reforms in
demonstration projects or through state experimentation under federal
waivers, allowing decisionmakers to determine which reforms accomplish
the best results in terms of decreased defensive medicine and decreased
patient injury. If the government then discovers that one such system of
patient protection accomplishes the best results, the federal government
could unify the nation under that system. Alternatively, given regional
differences in patient populations and hospital structures, the federal
government could continue to enforce different patient protection systems in different regions, much as the Medicare and Medicaid programs
enforce different quality controls and reimbursement systems for different kinds of hospitals, acknowledging that rural hospitals have different
needs than urban ones.129
I thus envision a process of experimentation and information aggregation, developed and implemented at the federal level, that would lead
over time to a stable system of medical malpractice and patient protection policy. Although created at the federal level, that stable system need
not be uniform across different patient or hospital groups. Federal decisionmaking and implementation is necessary only to ensure alignment of
incentives, not to ensure uniformity of substantive policy.
127. For explanation of waivers and demonstration projects, see supra notes 102–103.
128. See supra Part I.B.1.
129. For example, Medicare and Medicaid contain special treatment for
Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (2000 & Supp. 2005); 42
C.F.R. § 412.106 (2007).
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V. OTHER SNOWBALLS
So far, I have limited myself to medical malpractice policy, which is
my primary focus here. I have shown that prior federalization decisions
in healthcare policy have created an incentive problem for the states in
governing medical malpractice policy, and I have shown that at least
some federalization of medical malpractice reform is necessary to correct
that incentive problem. More generally, though, I have also shown that
any decision to federalize part (but not all) of a regulatory regime will
allow the states to externalize costs in a way that will alter their regulatory
incentives. It would be surprising—even incredible—if medical malpractice were the only regime in which we found this kind of snowball effect.
After all, Medicare and Medicaid are not the only federal programs that
regulate only a portion of a policy field, and there must be others that
affect related regulatory decisions in the states. There might even be
others that cause sufficiently significant externalization problems to justify jurisdictional integration under Tiebout’s model. Although a full
consideration of other such snowball scenarios is beyond the scope of this
Essay, it is worth highlighting two historical federalization decisions that
could be justified by reference to snowball problems, to demonstrate that
the snowball story is not limited to healthcare.
First, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)130 could be
theoretically justified by reference to a federalization snowball. The ADA
set a federal floor for antidiscrimination protections for persons with disabilities. There might be some economic justification, independent of a
snowball story, for federal antidiscrimination standards because there
could be a race to the bottom scenario; each state might worry that protective regulations would attract disabled people to its economy. On the
other hand, the presence of disabled people need not create a significant
strain on the economy if those people are employed—if they are not discriminated against in the labor market. And, of course, the strain of already-present disabled people would be lessened if the states prohibited
disability-based employment discrimination. Before the ADA, thus, the
states would have had some race to the bottom incentive to underprovide
antidiscrimination regulations, but the incentive might not have been as
strong as the race to the bottom incentive in, for example, environmental
law. That incentive alone, thus, might not justify federalization of antidiscrimination standards.
But that story ignores the impact of Supplemental Security Income
(SSI).131 Under the Social Security program, the federal government
foots the bill for disabled citizens’ unemployment. The states, thus, externalize onto the federal government a significant portion of the costs associated with unemployment among disabled citizens, including those asso130. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383.
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ciated with discrimination against those citizens. If the employers in a
state choose not to hire disabled citizens for discriminatory reasons, the
federal government will step in to support the consequently unemployed
citizens, relieving the state of a significant portion of the unemployment
costs associated with underprovision of antidiscrimination laws. The effect here is thus the same as the effect in medical malpractice; the federal
SSI program skews the states’ cost-benefit calculation in a way that causes
systematic underprovision of antidiscrimination regulation. In the end,
then, federalization of antidiscrimination standards may have been necessary (in part) to correct the externalization problem caused by federal
Social Security benefits—to correct for the states’ skewed cost-benefit calculations. The ADA was a theoretically justified and appropriate
response.
A similar story may justify the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).132 Like the ADA, ERISA may have served in part as
a solution to the states’ externalization of costs associated with their pension policies. Of course, there was a uniformity justification for ERISA—
for federalized pension regulations—since more and more employers
were operating across state lines, but there might also have been a significant externalization problem arising from the federal Social Security program. By providing Social Security benefits to the over-sixty-five population, the federal government foots part of the bill when employers abuse
or raid their employees’ pensions, harming those employees during retirement. The states are not forced to support impoverished retirees; instead, they externalize those costs onto the federal government and, by
extension, onto the other forty-nine states. ERISA (whether intended to
or not) provided a solution to that problem by fully federalizing and codifying a trust model for employers’ pension management, taking pension
regulation out of the hands of the states.
As noted above, there are undoubtedly other examples of regimes in
which snowball problems exist and other examples of regimes in which
partial federal programs have already snowballed into full federalization
of related regulatory regimes. Although comprehensive consideration of
those other examples could potentially fill another whole article, it is
worth emphasizing here that the federalization snowball story is important not just for health policy but for a wide range of regulatory regimes.
CONCLUSION
The legal literature has long held that any federal incursion into
medical malpractice policy would be functionally unjustified. But that
position ignores the externality—the distortion of the states’ incentives to
regulate—that arises from the federal government’s large and growing
role in financing American healthcare utilization. The federal government’s significant role in healthcare financing justifies a federal takeover
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).
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of medical malpractice reform in order to ensure that the decisionmaker
holds the right balance of regulatory incentives.
This necessary growth of the federal government is not mere centralization creep or empire building. It is a necessary expansion of federal
power that follows inevitably from the prior creation of partial federal
programs. It is a federalization snowball.

